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Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control:  
A Hierarchical Bayesian Approach to Test-Retest Reliability 
by 
 Jean-Paul Snijder 
Claremont Graduate University: 2021 
Cognitive control, also known as attentional control or executive function, is a set of 
fundamental processes that are utilized in a wide range of cognitive functioning: including 
working memory, reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. Currently, no existing 
theory of cognitive control unifies experimental and individual differences approaches. Some 
even argue that cognitive control as a psychometric construct does not exist at all. These 
disparities may exist in part because individual differences research in cognitive control utilizes 
tasks optimized for experimental effects (i.e., Stroop effect). As a result, many cognitive control 
tasks do not have reliable individual differences despite robust experimental effects (Hedge, 
Powell, & Sumner, 2018). In the current study, we examine the efficacy of a new task battery 
based on the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control theory (DMCC; Braver, 2012) to provide 
reliable estimates of individual differences in cognitive control. With two sets of analyses, the 
first traditional (e.g., split-half, ICC, and rho), and the second hierarchical Bayesian, we provide 
evidence that (1) reliable individual differences can be extracted from experimental tasks, and (2)  
weak correlations between tasks of cognitive control are not solely caused by the attenuation of 
unreliable estimates. The implications of our findings suggest that it is unlikely that poor 
measurement practices are the cause of the weak between-task correlations in cognitive control, 
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Cognitive control is a construct used to refer to the set of processes involved in deliberate 
regulation of information processing to facilitate goal-directed behavior (Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Posner & Snyder, 1979). Cognitive control is associated with several important real-world 
outcomes including psychopathology (Snyder et al., 2015), impulsivity (Sharma et al., 2014), 
addiction (Hester & Garavan, 2004), and age-related cognitive declines (Hasher et al., 1991). 
Also, the ability to engage cognitive control is a strong predictor of working memory capacity 
(WMC), which is associated with a broad range of outcomes, including academic achievement 
(Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Gathercole et al., 2003), reading comprehension (Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980), mathematical ability (Ramirez et al., 2016), and multi-tasking (Redick et al., 
2016). Cognitive control also plays an important role in contemporary theories of 
intelligence. By many accounts, cognitive control is considered to be the primary source of 
variance in overall cognitive ability (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kovacs & Conway, 2016; Van Der 
Maas et al., 2006). The association between WMC and intelligence has been suggested to arise 
due to both processes’ reliance on the ability to regulate attention (e.g., cognitive control) in 
order to ignore distractors (Engle, 2002, 2018; Kane et al., 2007). Improvement in cognitive 
control ability therefore provides a boost to intelligence and allows for the differentiation of 
cognitive abilities (Kovacs & Conway, 2016). 
However, there are some problems with the construct validity of cognitive control. First 
of all, there is the inconsistency of definitions. Cognitive control is also referred to as executive 
function, executive control, controlled attention, and attentional control (Diamond, 2013). Even 
the postulated processes within the construct are referred to by different names (Rey-Mermet et 





interference, control of motor interference, and control of verbal-linguistic interference. In 
comparison, Friedman and Miyake (2004) refer to these processes as resistance to distracter 
interference, inhibition of prepotent responses, and resistance to proactive interference, and 
Hasher et al. (2007) use access, restraint, and deletion.  
Second, cognitive control research is plagued by inconsistencies in hypothesized latent 
variables and factor structure. Friedman and Miyake (2004) found that their postulated inhibition 
processes resistance to distractor interference (i.e., the ability to ignore distracting external 
information) and inhibition of prepotent responses (i.e., suppressing dominant responses) were 
highly correlated (r = .67). The authors found the strength of this relationship enough evidence to 
combine them into a single latent construct, namely, response-distractor inhibition. Pettigrew 
and Martin (2014) found support for this combined construct, however, in the same year Stahl et 
al. found support for the separability of distracter- and response-related interference. Some 
studies found that tasks often used to measure inhibition (e.g., Eriksen and Simon tasks) had no 
common variance, and thus, that the variance was task-specific (Keye et al., 2009; Wilhelm et 
al., 2013). Other studies were not able to extract an inhibition factor at all (Klauer et al., 2010; 
Krumm et al., 2009; van der Sluis et al., 2007).  
Another common issue with cognitive control is that correlations between measures of 
cognitive control are often weak. Considering that these tasks are assumed to tap the same 
psychometric construct, this is counterintuitive. Here is a non-exhaustive but representative 
sample of studies reporting correlations between tasks of cognitive control. Friedman and 
colleagues (2016): Stroop and Antisaccade, r = .17; Stroop and Stop-signal, r = .15; Antisaccade 
and Stop-signal, r = .26. Gustavson and colleagues (2018): Stroop and AX-CPT, r = .16; Stroop 





(2013): Antisaccade and Simon effect, r = -.12; Flanker effect and Simon effect, r = -.01. 
Antisaccade was not run in the same study as the Flanker test, hence no reported correlation. 
Finally, Rey-Mermet and colleagues (2019) reported 21 correlations between Number Stroop, 
Arrow Flanker, Letter Flanker, Simon, Antisaccade, and Stop-signal: ranging from r = -.16 to r = 
.15. Finally, in a large meta-analysis of 70 studies producing 2,114 between-task correlations, 
von Bastian et al., (2020) report a median correlation of .16, with most studies not surpassing 
between-task correlations of .30.  
Taken together, the inconsistencies in nomenclature and processes, and the weak 
between-measure correlations have a sparked a debate on whether a coherent psychometric 
construct of cognitive control even exists. One side argues that poor correlational results between 
these tasks indicate that cognitive control is perhaps not a coherent psychometric construct (Paap 
& Sawi, 2016; Rey-Mermet et al., 2018). Another side argues that many of these inconsistent 
and poor correlational results stem from measurement issues and poor operationalization of the 
construct (Draheim et al., 2020; Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). Given the practical and 
theoretical importance of cognitive control in clinical applications and in theories of working 
memory and intelligence outlined above, these measurement issues warrant further examination 
before discarding the construct as a whole. After an encapsulation of important theories that laid 
the groundwork for research in cognitive control, measurement of cognitive control will be 
discussed.    
2 Theories of Cognitive Control 
2.1 Norman and Shallice (1986) 
Early research on cognitive control focused on inhibition of automatic behavior in novel 





neurocognitive models, Norman and Shallice proposed a cognitive control model of executive 
functioning (1986) (See Figure 1). In their seminal work, they outline how schemas are activated 
to instruct behavior. A schema, in this sense, is a collection of sequential thoughts and actions 
triggered by perceptual stimuli. Schemas can be subdivided into two groups; schemas for 
automated and for controlled processes. Automated, or routine, processes are defined here as 
processes that are engaged when performing a task or action that do not require attentional 
resources (Norman & Bobrow, 1975); for example, riding a bike after many years of practice. 
Controlled processes are tasks or actions that require deliberate and sustained attention. These 
are often employed when important situations, dangerous environments, or novel problems 
present themselves and navigating behavior successfully is paramount. For example, riding a 
bike for the first time in new city during rush hour in a country where they drive on the opposite 
side of the road.  
Figure 1  
Schematic model of the cognitive control model of executive function 
 
Norman and Shallice (1986) propose that schemas are activated by a process called 
contention scheduling (CS). CS ensures that the “optimal” schema is activated and inhibits 





subjective. If a schema is repeatedly activated given a certain event, its threshold for activation is 
lowered and considered optimal for similar future events. The CS mechanism is suggested to 
work relatively straightforward; it allows schemas to compete for activation and it activates a 
schema once it reaches its activation threshold. The main role of CS is to subconsciously monitor 
for automated and routine situations. When a situation requires a more controlled and conscious 
decision, for example when it is novel or complex, the supervisory attentional system (SAS) is 
engaged. When engaged, the SAS controls the CS by influencing schema activation thresholds 
and activating existing schemas to novel problems (e.g., using existing strategies in situations for 
which a schema does not exist). The SAS does not directly control action and decision making, 
but rather the thresholds for activation and inhibition of competing schemas.  
As the more controlled construct, the SAS is an early mechanism for what now is dubbed 
“cognitive control”. The account by Norman and Shallice was a frontrunner for future research 
on cognitive control, however, it was not yet specific enough. For one, it was too broad in its 
description of processes related to the SAS, which made distinguishing SAS from other 
constructs, such as intelligence, difficult. It is important to note that the failure to specify 
processes of cognitive control is a common theme throughout the lifespan of this research. 
2.2 Shallice and Burgess (1996) 
Shallice and Burgess were the first to explore whether the Norman and Shallice (SAS) is 
fractionable into different sub-processes (1996). For about two decades, scholars generally 
agreed that the prefrontal cortex housed an important central ability that influenced multiple 
domains, but this ability was mainly characterized as a single type of process. Some suggested 
that this singular process was what underlies general intelligence, or g, and most commonly were 





1995; Kimberg & Farah, 1993). Other unitary accounts existed as well, but the idea that the 
prefrontal cortex carried only a single key process was the overarching school of thought. 
Alternatively, Shallice and Burgess suggested that even if the SAS was a single system, it was 
incorrect to view it as carrying out only a single process. The authors showed evidence for “the 
existence of a variety of processes carried out by different subsystems but operating together to 
have a globally integrated function”. They observed “very low correlations across patients on 
more than one measure…”, and argued for the separability of processes stemming from the 
prefrontal cortex. The hypothesis that a central attention system is a multi-process system is what 
eventually lead to contemporary theories of cognitive control. However, note that weak 
correlations between measures of cognitive control played an important role in advancing 
research of cognitive control, yet currently are also the reason for the suggestion that cognitive 
control might not be a valid construct.  
2.3 Miller and Cohen (2001) 
At the beginning of this century, Miller and Cohen published the important Integrative 
Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function (2001). The authors argue that cognitive control is the 
main function of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and consists of different processes such as selective 
attention, error monitoring, decision-making, and inhibitions of stimuli and response. They not 
only specified a set of cognitive control sub-processes, but also suggested mechanisms by which 
those sub-processes are executed, and provided a review of neurobiological evidence that 
supported their theory.  
The integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function states that the PFC is critical for 
carrying out processes that require top-down processing; that is, when behavior benefits greatly 





example, if one’s goal is to reach the other side of a busy road safely, then observing and timing 
bi-directional traffic, locating a pedestrian crossing, or alternatively, determining the presence or 
absence of law enforcement, are all behaviors that need to be actively controlled in order to 
complete the goal. Such processes are often aimed to be operationalized by cognitive-behavioral 
tasks. For example, in the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) subjects are presented with words that are 
names of colors (e.g., the word “GREEN”) in different colored fonts (e.g., green, yellow, red). 
Here, correct performance, and hence the internalized goal, is based on the task rule to name the 
font-color rather than to verbalize the color-word. Generally, reading of a simple word is a 
bottom-up, automated, and a much practiced process and hence, has strong existing mappings 
between reading the word, semantic processing, and verbalizing it. According to Miller and 
Cohen’s theory, the PFC is not critical in such processes. However, in an incongruent trial, the 
Stroop task requires that subjects inhibit the tendency of such reading and then selectively attend 
to the color of the font. Inhibiting and selectively attending are considered processes with weaker 
existing mappings than the automated reading, and hence, are suggested by Miller and Cohen to 
require the PFC to control behavior for a correct performance of the task.  
The theory also describes how the PFC controls behavior. The theory builds on an earlier 
principle by Desimone and Duncan (1995) which states that multiple available behaviors exist 
simultaneously and compete to be executed. Neurobiologically, the executed behavior is the 
behavior downstream of the most excited neural pathway. According to Miller and Cohen, 
cognitive control is the voluntary biasing of pathway towards the behavior that best fits current 
task-goals. The PFC resolves competition by inhibiting pathways of alternative behaviors and 
exciting the pathways to the preferred behavior. This preferential activation establishes the 





how the PFC controls behavior, can be viewed as the neural implementation of the internal and 
external rules and goals governing controlled behavior. 
Finally, Miller and Cohen review neurobiological evidence for the distinction between a 
system that regulates routine behavior (contention scheduling) and a system for deliberate 
conscious control (supervisory attentional system). Their strongest evidence relies on the notion 
that if the PFC is crucial in the SAS, but not in the CS, then damage to PFC would impact the 
ability to control behavior, but not routine behavior. In their manuscript, the authors present prior 
findings following that logic. First, it is generally known in clinical neuropsychology that 
damage to the prefrontal structures leave execution of basic skills unaffected (Walsh, 1978). 
Second, performance on WAIS subtests is also relatively unaffected by frontal lesions (McFie, 
1960). Third, contrasting evidence can be found in Lhermitte et al., (1972). This classic study 
showed that two patients with frontal lobe lesions were able to complete the verbal and 
performance WAIS tasks at normal levels. However, their performance on the WAIS Block 
Design or the reproduction of a complex figure (i.e., Figure of Rey) was extremely poor. These 
are tasks that require more controlled processes such as novel programming, planning, and 
problem solving. For more evidence, see Norman and Shallice (1986).  
2.4 Miyake et al. (2000) 
Miller and Cohen’s theory provided a framework based on neurobiological evidence that 
supported mechanistically explicit hypotheses about processes of cognitive control. Around the 
same time, Miyake and colleagues (2000) published their influential (~ 13,000 citations 
currently) unity/diversity framework of cognitive control, though their theory was based on 
cognitive-behavioral evidence. Their seminal work employed structural equation modeling on 





constructs. More specifically, three latent factors emerged: shifting between task sets, updating 
and monitoring of information, and inhibition of prepotent responses. Their continued work 
(Friedman et al., 2008; Friedman & Miyake, 2017; Miyake & Friedman, 2012) has shown an 
additional higher-order common factor (i.e., cognitive control) that accounts for covariance 
across the latent factors. Friedman and Miyake (2017) suggest that this common factor reflects 
active goal maintenance and top-down biasing of attention. Yet, despite the popularity of this 
unity/diversity model, it seemingly has one weakness; the latent factor termed inhibition by 
Miyake and colleagues is not consistently evident.   
In addition to the problems with the inhibition factor that have already been mentioned in 
the introduction (e.g., no common variance between inhibition tasks; no inhibition latent factor 
found at all), there are some additional concerns with the unity/diversity framework worth 
mentioning here. One, a meta-analytic review showed that out of the studies that found support 
for these models, only a few tested other models (Karr et al., 2018). Two, the same meta-analytic 
review by Karr and colleagues reported that many studies based on this theory suffered from low 
rates of model acceptance and model selection. These issues were generally attributed to the 
small sample sizes, high model complexities, and poor reliability of the experiments. Three, even 
though the factor-loadings of updating and shifting are often found to be acceptable (Ecker et al., 
2010; Singh et al., 2018; von Bastian & Druey, 2017), they are found to be weak for the 
inhibition factor (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Gustavson et al., 2018; Hedge, Powell, Bompas, et 
al., 2018; Paap & Greenberg, 2013; Rey-Mermet et al., 2019). And four, latent factors of 
inhibition are often dominated by a single task (typically, the anti-saccade task (Rey-Mermet et 





In conclusion, Miyake et al. (2000) promote a model of cognitive control with three 
emerging (latent) processes; shifting, updating, and inhibition. Like Miller and Cohen (2001), 
Miyake et al. present evidence that cognitive control consists of different processes underlying a 
central function. However, a wide-scale review of studies employing this unity/diversity model 
reveals mixed evidence for its construct validity. As previously mentioned, such inconsistent and 
weak individual differences results perhaps stem from measurement issues.  
3 Measurement of Cognitive Control 
3.1 Experimental Approach 
Cognitive-behavioral tasks are designed to measure whether theorized processes indeed 
manifest behaviorally. Often, existing tasks are adapted to find behavioral evidence of such 
processes. Cognitive control is often measured by tasks that through experimental manipulations 
create two or more trial types. A baseline trial generally presents the subject with low (or no) 
conflict and correct performance does not require much cognitive control. An experimental trial 
includes a manipulation which causes interference, and hence, requires cognitive control to 
resolve this interference, necessary for correct performance. A classic example of this is the 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). There are generally two types of trial in the Stroop task. In the non-
interference trial, more commonly known as a congruent trial in the Stroop task, the color-names 
match the font-color in which they are presented (e.g., “GREEN” in a green font-color). In 
contrast, in the interference trail, referred to as an incongruent trial, the color-names do not 
match the font-color (e.g., “GREEN” in a red font-color). Correct performance in an incongruent 
trial requires the subject to resolve the conflict that arises between the reading of the color-word 





performance (lower accuracy and slower reaction time) when compared to congruent 
performance. 
Experimental effects of cognitive control are numerous and varied, including the 
congruency or conflict effect (Stroop, 1935), response inhibition (Hallett, 1978), error-related 
slowing (Rabbitt, 1966), sequential congruency effects (Gratton et al., 1992), costs of switching 
between tasks or completing multiple tasks simultaneously (Koch et al., 2018), and monitoring 
and updating of information (Miyake et al., 2000). Each of these paradigms reveals robust and 
reliable experimental effects that are considered signatures of cognitive control. Together, these 
experimental effects and other “benchmark findings” in psychology and neuroscience help to 
establish and test theories and models of cognitive control, which in turn help to guide further 
investigation and research.  
Yet, models based on experimental evidence alone are limited; they provide an account 
of normative behavior but do not explain individual differences in cognitive control. A unified 
approach to the study of cognitive control would require a combination of experimental and 
correlational methods (Cronbach, 1957). Ideally, the experimental and correlational approaches 
inform each other, allowing for a theoretical framework that integrates different kinds of 
empirical evidence and accounts for inter-individual differences in terms of intra-individual 
psychological processes.  
3.2 Individual Differences Approach 
As mentioned in the introduction, the weak correlations between the measures of 
cognitive control indicate that the individual differences dimension has not been successfully 
integrated. One difference with other areas of individual differences research such as personality 





between people. Correlational approaches in cognitive control research have mostly consisted of 
comparing effects from experimental measures. Because of the robustness of these effects, 
differences in the size of the effects were assumed to reflect a general cognitive control ability 
(von Bastian et al., 2020). This brings us to the main concern addressed in this paper; can 
measures of cognitive control derived from experimental tasks be used to explain individual 
differences in control ability? 
This is not an entirely new concern, in fact, it is based on a longstanding concern in 
Psychology. In 1957, Cronbach famously quipped, “Individual differences have been an 
annoyance rather than a challenge to the experimenter” (Cronbach, 1957, p. 674). Recently 
there seems to be an increased awareness of psychometric issues when employing experimental 
cognitive tasks to measure individual differences. Here, three of those issues are discussed: (a) 
the poor reliability of existing measures, (b) the use of difference scores in individual differences 
studies, and (c) the effect of reliability on correlations between measures.  
One popular account by Hedge, Powell, and Sumner (2018), aptly titled “[t]he reliability 
paradox…” examines the phenomenon that robust cognitive-behavioral tasks do not produce 
reliable individual differences measures. They report the test-retest reliabilities of 7 classic 
experimental effects (e.g., Stroop, flanker) used in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. To 
summarize their results, their reliabilities were generally weak with a median ICC = .40. Their 
investigation clearly illustrates that experimental effects in cognitive control tasks are robust, yet 
the test-retest reliabilities are weak and in many cases are not reliable or only moderately 
reliable.  
One explanation for this paradox is that the meaning of “reliable” is different in 





intended effect is replicated across multiple studies (in different labs, with different stimuli, etc.). 
In contrast, an individual differences measure is considered reliable when it ranks subjects 
consistently in terms of the effect size. Experimental reliability is best served by low between-
subject variance (e.g., homogeneous measures) and high within-subject variance (e.g., a large 
effect due to a manipulation). Contrarily, correlational reliability is best served by high between-
subject variance (e.g., heterogeneous measures), making it easier to tease apart performance 
which is preferable for finding individual differences. Critically, between-subject variance is 
considered measurement error in experimental designs and typically are designed to minimize 
this noise (Burgess, 1997). As a result, these tasks may be not be suitable as reliable measures in 
individual differences research (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018).  
Another measurement issue stems from the popular use of difference scores in cognitive-
behavioral tasks. Many classic effects (e.g., the Stroop effect) are a simple difference score based 
on the contrast between the two experimental task trial types (e.g., Stroop effect = incongruent – 
congruent trial performance). However, from a psychometric perspective, difference scores are 
notoriously problematic for reliability (Caruso, 2004; Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Lord, 1956). It is 
common knowledge that the reliability of a difference score is not as robust as the reliability of 
its components (Edwards, 2001; Rogosa, 1988, 1995; Willett, 1988; Zimmerman & Williams, 
1998; Zumbo, 1999). This is a purely psychometric phenomenon. Generally, when taking the 
difference between two measures, the amount of between-subject variance is lowered, but the 
measurement error is relatively unaffected. Hence, the ratio of measurement error to between-
subject variance increases. Lower between-subject variance increases experimental reliability 
(less error or “noise”). Critically however, it decreases the reliability of individual differences 





subjects when ranking them. Thus, difference scores are well suited in experimental, but not in 
individual differences research. For an applied illustration, see Rodebaugh et al., (2016). 
Finally, Spearman (1904) noted that measurement error attenuates the maximum 
attainable correlation between two measures. A “true” between-measure correlation of, for 
example, .80, can only be attained if both measures are free of measurement error. The reliability 
coefficient essentially reflects the measurement error in each measure individually, hence, a 
correlation between two measures is constrained by the average of their individual reliabilities 
(Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Nunnally Jr., 1970; Spearman, 1904).  
To summarize three main issues with the measurement of cognitive control: (a) 
experimental tasks are used to research individual differences, but are designed to minimize 
between-subject variance, which oftentimes causes poor reliability of the measures; (b) the 
popular use of difference scores further accentuates the issue of poor reliability, because it 
increases the ratio of measurement error to between-subject error; and (c) a correlation between 
two measures is constrained by the reliability of each measure; if individual differences in 
cognitive control are not reliable, correlational results are difficult to interpret.  
4 Reliability 
These reliability issues are not just a problem in cognitive science (Parsons et al., 2019); 
so how is it possible that they have not been noticed on a grand scale? For one, reliability 
estimates are not always reported; this may lead to task reliability not being considered as one of 
the suspects of poor correlational results (Flake et al., 2017; Hussey & Hughes, 2018). 
Consequently, some results may have been erroneously reported as replicable and generalizable, 
perhaps propagating false standards in the field (e.g., the replication crisis). Furthermore, when 





common pitfalls of calculating reliability are presented and a standard methodological approach 
in reporting individual differences reliability is discussed.   
4.1 Internal Consistency 
There are many ways to estimate reliability and currently there is no standardized 
procedure (Parsons et al., 2019). Additionally, the reliability methods offered in many statistical 
software packages assume that the data conforms to analysis-specific assumptions. For example, 
a common and well-known method for estimating reliability is Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of 
internal consistency. Alpha is most commonly derived by averaging the correlations between 
each item (trial) and the sum of the remaining items (trials). The default method offered in 
statistical software packages calculates alpha based on the assumption that the order of the items 
is identical for all subjects. Furthermore, it is assumed that each item measures the same 
underlying construct, to varying degrees, as a function of item difficulty and discriminability. In 
survey research, this is often the case. However, in cognitive-behavioral tasks, trial order is often 
randomized. More concerning, the cognitive processes involved in task performance may vary 
across trials, as a function of practice, fatigue, or strategy development/deployment, or even due 
to the experiment’s own manipulations. If these issues are ignored, which is typically the case, 
then alpha reliability estimates may not be accurate nor valid. Hence, standard Cronbach’s alpha 
is generally unsuitable as an index of reliability for tasks designed to measure individual 
differences in cognitive control.  
Alpha can also be calculated as the average of correlations between two halves of the 
data (e.g., split-half reliability). Most commonly, the data are split into the first and second half 
or even- and odd-numbered trials. However, it has been demonstrated that split-half reliabilities 





to apply multiple random splits to the data to generate multiple split-half reliability estimates and 
then taking the average of all split-half estimates as the overall reliability estimate (Enock et al., 
2014; Parsons et al., 2019). Such permutation-based method for calculating split-half reliability 
approximates Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), while simultaneously avoiding the pitfalls 
described above. Importantly, splitting the number of observations in half leads to 
underestimation. The Spearman-Brown (prophecy) formula can be applied to correct for this 
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4.2 Test-Retest Reliability 
When repeated measures are available, it is possible to calculate test-retest reliability 
estimates. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) provides evidence for or against the 
measure’s stability over time. More specifically, ICC indicates how well two measurements 
consistently rank-order the subjects. Ten different forms of ICC have been developed (Mcgraw 
& Wong, 1996), resulting from a combination of three specified parameters; model selection, 
type, and the definition of the relationship.  
When selecting a model based on a research design, three models are available to choose 
from: (a) one-way random-effects model, in which each subject is rated by a different set of 
raters; (b) two-way random-effects model, in which random raters are chosen from a population 
of similar raters. This model is chosen when the reliability results are to be generalized across 
different raters (e.g., different clinicians). And (c) two-way mixed-effects model, in which the 





Selecting a type is more straightforward. If the mean from multiple raters is used to 
calculate the measure of interest, the type “mean of k raters” should be selected. Alternatively, if 
the measure is based on a single rater, then “single rater” should be selected.  
In selecting the definition of the relationship, ICC is estimated based on either a 
consistency or absolute agreement between the two measurements (e.g., the relationship). A 
consistency relationship is not affected by systematic changes (e.g., practice effects, learning 
between measurements) and only the consistency of the rank-order is rated. Absolute agreement 
expects the two measurements to be identical in rank-order and in value (e.g., session mean), in 
other words, this relationship is affected by systematic differences. For example: these two 
measurements {1,2,3}, {4,5,6} would have a perfect consistent relationship (ICC = 1.00), but the 
measurements are not in absolute agreement (ICC = .09). This decision is important in 
calculating test-retest reliability; should ICC consider systematic differences? If one expects their 
data to have systematic differences between time one and time two (e.g., practice effects, 
differences in state), then a consistency relationship should be selected. Otherwise, absolute 
agreement should be selected. 
We suggest, as do others ( Koo & Li, 2016; Parsons et al., 2019), that when estimating 
test-retest reliability of measurements from computerized cognitive-behavioral tasks (e.g., single 
rater), the important decision is the specification of relationship definition. If systematic 
differences are expected between time one and time two, then the preferred form of ICC is a two-
way mixed-effects, consistency, with a single rater/measurement ((3,1) in Shrout and Fleiss 
(1979) convention). If one expects no such differences, then calculate ICC based on two-way 
random-effects, absolute agreement, with a single rater/measurement ((2,1) in Shrout and Fleiss 





There are many methods to estimate reliability and it seems that not all researchers are 
aware of all the options or the assumptions underlying each method. Reliability is crucial when 
making inferences from correlational results, and hence, correctly estimating and reporting 
reliability should be a top priority in any individual differences research. Reliability estimates of 
internal consistency (i.e., permutation-based split-half) should always be reported. When 
possible test-retest reliability should be reported as well; ICC is robust and provides options for 
different research designs. 
5 Interim Summary 
In recent years a number of psychometric issues in the field of cognitive control have led 
to a debate regarding the construct’s validity. Commonly reported concerns include poor 
reliability of measures, especially of those derived from difference scores, and unexpected weak 
between-measure correlations. Based on this, a number of studies have suggested that cognitive 
control research, as is, should perhaps be abandoned (e.g., Paap & Sawi, 2016; Rey-Mermet et 
al., 2018). Yet, others advocate further examining these issues before taking such drastic 
measures (Draheim et al., 2020; Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). These issues are prevalent 
when approaching cognitive control from an individual differences perspective using established 
experimental tasks (e.g., the Stroop, flanker, etc.). Psychometrically, these tasks are created to 
produce a variance structure optimal for analyzing experimental effects, however, the same 
structure turns out to be unsuitable for individual differences (e.g., Rodebaugh et al., 2016). Such 
a divide between the two research traditions (e.g., experimental and correlational), is nothing 
new (Cronbach, 1957). The question on whether and how this divide can be bridged remains. 
Based on the seemingly pivotal role of reliability, future studies should investigate whether 





experimental tasks provide reliable individual differences estimates of cognitive control? And do 
the weak between-task correlations of cognitive control stem from reliability issues? 
Recent work suggests at least two possible approaches that could potentially answer these 
questions (von Bastian et al., 2020). A first approach is to introduce theoretically motivated task 
manipulations in order to increase between-subject variance, and hence, reliability. The Dual 
Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMC) account provides a theoretical framework that 
decomposes cognitive control into two qualitatively distinct mechanisms – proactive control and 
reactive control (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012). Empirical findings provide compelling 
evidence in support of these two modes of control and suggest that an important source of 
variability in control function at both the individual- and group-level is the bias or preference to 
adopt one control mode over the other mode (Barch et al., 2001; Braver et al., 2001). Gonthier 
and colleagues (2016) have shown that task manipulations can indeed shift subjects toward either 
mode of control. Such added between-subject variance should produce more reliable measures of 
cognitive control.  
A second approach has been suggested by Rouder and Haaf (2019) and Haines et al. 
(2020). They propose that traditional aggregate statistics are not suitable for extracting individual 
differences estimates. There are many examples of how averaging across individuals while 
ignoring “uncertainty” (i.e., individual-level variation) leads to faulty inferences (e.g., Davis-
Stober et al., 2016; Estes, 1956; Heathcote et al., 2000; Liew et al., 2016; Pagan, 1984; 
Vandekerckhove, 2014). Additionally, Rouder and Haaf provide evidence that aggregation, or 
averaging subject-by-task, “greatly” attenuates measures of reliability, and hence, correlation. 
Traditional approaches assume the mean point-estimates (MPE) per subject represents their 





trial-level noise and it is suggested that reliable individual differences can be extracted through 
modeling this individual-level variability.  
This dissertation is a study with two sets of analyses aimed at investigating the viability 
of these two approaches in recovering reliable individual differences estimates from cognitive 
control tasks. With the first set of analyses, evidence is presented to show that theoretically 
motivated task manipulations alone do not improve reliability markedly. However, results and 
patterns that emerged are informative nonetheless. For instance, we show that poor reliability 
indeed bottlenecks, and hence, alters theoretical interpretations of between-task correlations. 
Furthermore, we show evidence that difference scores derived from experimental tasks with 
traditional statistics are not suitable for individual differences. The second set of analyses focuses 
on modeling trial-level variability through Hierarchical Bayesian Modeling (HBM) using the 
same data. At this stage there is promising preliminary evidence that HBM can extract reliable 
individual differences test-retest estimates (Haines et al., 2020). Although cautiously optimistic 
of the efficacy this approach, a null outcome would provide important evidence that individual 
differences research of cognitive control needs serious restructuring.  
6 Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control Task Battery 
The Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMC) framework suggests that cognitive 
control operates in two qualitatively distinct modes; a proactive control mode and reactive 
control mode (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007). Proactive control refers to a sustained and 
anticipatory mode of control that is goal-directed, allowing individuals to actively and optimally 
configure processing resources prior to the onset of task demands. Reactive control, by contrast, 
involves a transient mode of control that is stimulus-driven, which relies upon temporarily 





event (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007). In other words, proactive control is planning ahead for 
alternate timelines, while reactive control is “I will deal with it when I need to”. Prior research 
has dissociated these two modes in both healthy and impaired populations (Braver et al., 2005; 
De Pisapia & Braver, 2006); based on behavioral signatures in young adults (Gonthier et al., 
2016); and among different age groups (Bugg, 2014; Paxton et al., 2008). 
In response to challenges with reliability of cognitive control paradigms, the DMC group 
created a cognitive control task battery including proactive and reactive variants of four well-
established cognitive tasks; Stroop, AX-CPT, Cued Task-Switching, and Sternberg Working 
Memory. These tasks are theorized to measure selective attention, context processing, multi-
tasking, and working memory, respectively. The variants were theoretically optimized to capture 
individual variability in proactive and reactive control. Specifically, there were three variants of 
each task representing different experimental conditions: (a) a baseline condition that maximizes 
within- and between-subject variability, which does not bias the adoption of proactive or reactive 
control; (b) a proactive condition that shifts individuals toward proactive control; (c) a reactive 
condition that independently engages the reactive mode of control. As will be detailed for each 
task in the method section, specifying a priori behavioral performance patterns across the three 
variants enabled us to examine whether proactive and reactive control variants did indeed 
produce the predicted shifts in control. Additionally, below we describe the method of the study 
and the rationale for the experimental manipulations underlying the theoretical-based variants of 








7 Method  
7.1 Subjects 
Subjects were recruited via the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) on-line platform. The 
TurkPrime interface was used to post study descriptions, manage recruitment and payment, send 
out reminder emails and handle all other communication with the subjects. After reading a 
description of the study that indicated its multi-session nature and time commitment, interested 
subjects accessed a link which allowed them to review and sign the consent form. After signing 
the consent, the web-links for the first session of the study were made available over MTurk. 
Subjects were not restricted with regard to age range, and as such a wide range were included in 
the sample (22-64, M=37.11, SD=9.90; 82 females, 47 males).  
7.2 Design and Procedure 
The study protocol consisted of 30 separate testing sessions that subjects completed in a 
sequential manner (15 for the test phase, and another 15 for retest). Subjects were asked to 
complete the sessions at a rate of 5 per week, i.e., 6 weeks to complete the full protocol. Each 
session lasted approximately 20-40 minutes in duration, with the exception of the first session, 
which was 1 hour in duration (and included a Stroop practice to validate operation of vocal 
response recording plus a battery of demographic and self-report questionnaires). To both 
incentivize and prorate study completion, completion of the first session of both test and retest 
phases resulted in a $4 payment, each subsequent session was paid $2, with the exception of 
session 6 and 11, which were paid $4 for each. Additional bonuses of $20 were paid for 
completion of the test phase and $30 for full study completion. Together, successful completion 





A set of 5 sessions were posted at the beginning of each week through MTurk, and were 
also sent through emails to the subjects. Two reminder emails were also typically sent during the 
week to remind subjects of the completion deadline for the set (by the end of the week).  If 
subjects failed to complete the weeks’ sessions by the designated deadline, they were not invited 
back to participate in subsequent sessions. For each completed session, subjects would enter in a 
completion code and the experimenter would review each session results for completion and 
approve the payment within a week through TurkPrime. If subjects dropped from the study, they 
still received prorated payment for all sessions completed. 
For each completed session, the experimenter checked for overall accuracy and 
completion of each task and questionnaire to make sure that subjects were complying with 
instructions and maintaining sufficient attention to the task.  A criterion of 60% accuracy and 
response rate was used to determine whether the data would be included, and the subject invited 
to remain in the study. For each task or questionnaire that did not meet the criterion, the 
experimenter attempted to communicate with the subject first to determine if they had trouble 
understanding the instructions or had technical difficulties. If so, the subject was given a second 
chance to complete the task before a designated deadline. Within each of the test and retest 
phases, sessions were conducted in a fixed order for all subjects.  
7.3 Task Paradigms 
7.3.1 Stroop  
In this vocal Stroop task (see Figure 2), color words are presented in colored font and 
subjects name the font color out loud. For each trial, vocal response latencies were detected, and 
accuracy recorded using the computer’s built in voice recognition software. Subjects were given 





accuracy. Adequacy of the automated voice recognition was validated in previous pilot testing, 
and individually for each subject based on their first testing session, which contained a practice 
block of 25 standard Stroop trials. If responses could not be detected for most of the trials, the 
subject was not asked to continue with further testing.  
The current variants of the Stroop were based on the design of previously published work 
(Gonthier et al., 2016; Gourley et al., 2016) and constructed using two different sets of four 
colors, in which the relative proportion of congruent and incongruent trials were manipulated in 
different ways (details below). One set (black, green, pink, yellow) was unbiased, in that the 
proportion of congruent to incongruent stimuli was 50:50 (this set was termed PC-50). The other 
set of four colors (red, blue, purple, white) was biased in the proportion of congruent and 
incongruent trials, either mostly congruent or mostly incongruent, varied across conditions. The 
two sets of stimuli were nonoverlapping, such that on incongruent trials, the word name was one 
of the three remaining colors from that set (e.g., green font with “black”, “pink” or “yellow”; red 
font with “blue”, “purple” or “white”). All trials consisted of the following stimulus parameters: 
items were presented centrally on a gray screen for 5000 msec duration or until a response was 













Schematic representation of tasks used and their conditions 
 
Note. The trial proceedings pictured represent those of a typical baseline session. Slight 
variations from the baseline session might have been presented during the proactive or reactive 
sessions, but these are detailed in the methods section. The AX-CPT task is a simplified 






Manipulation Rationale. A commonly used approach to manipulating cognitive control 
demands in the Stroop task is to vary list-wide proportion congruence (PC; Jacoby et al., 2003; 
Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Under high list-wide PC conditions, congruent trials are frequent and 
incongruent trials are rare within a block, such that control demands are on average low and 
intermittent. In contrast, under low list-wide PC conditions (rare congruent trials, frequent 
incongruent), there is a high probability of interference within a block, increasing anticipatory 
control demands.  
In the proactive condition, PC is decreased in a list-wide manner; we and others have 
hypothesized that the tendency to utilize proactive control will increase in low PC conditions 
(Bugg, 2014; Bugg & Chanani, 2011; Gonthier et al., 2016; Hutchison et al., 2013). In this case, 
proactive control is theoretically associated with sustained maintenance of the task goal to attend 
to the ink color and ignore the word, which should be present in a consistent (i.e., present on all 
trials) and preparatory manner (i.e., engaged even prior to stimulus onset). Thus, the key 
prediction is that the Stroop effect (average slowing or increase in errors on incongruent relative 
to congruent trials) should be reduced on all trials, relative to a baseline, high list-wide PC 
condition, reflecting improved performance on incongruent trials (see Gonthier et al., 2016).  
In the reactive condition, PC is also manipulated but in an item-specific, rather than list-
wide fashion. In this case, specific colors will occur with low PC (e.g., items appearing in green 
font will frequently be incongruent), while others may occur with high PC (e.g., items appearing 
in red font will frequently be congruent), and these items are randomly intermixed such that 
subjects cannot predict whether a low PC or high PC item will appear on a given trial. This type 
of item-specific PC manipulation is theoretically predicted to enhance the utilization of reactive 





these items, strong associations develop between a critical feature (a specific ink color) and 
increased control demands (i.e., high interference), leading to more effective goal retrieval and 
utilization upon presentation of a stimulus that includes this feature (e.g., a word printed in a 
green font). The engagement of reactive control is expected to be transient, present only after 
stimulus onset, and only engaged by low PC incongruent items.  
Baseline Session. In the baseline session the trials were manipulated in a list-wide, mostly 
congruent (LW-MC) manner. Subjects completed a total of 288 trials during the baseline session, 
in which there were 96 PC-50 trials (48 congruent, 48 incongruent), and 192 biased trials. The 
biased set had 75% congruent (144 trials) and 25% incongruent (48 trials) trials. Consequently, 
the list-wide proportion congruency for the baseline session was 66%. The session was divided 
into two blocks of 144 trials each, between which subjects were instructed to rest for one minute.    
Proactive Session. In the proactive session, the trials were manipulated in a list-wide, mostly 
incongruent (LW-MI) manner. Subjects completed a total of 288 trials during the proactive 
session, in which there were 96 trials PC-50 (48 congruent, 48 incongruent), and 192 biased 
trials. The biased set had 25% congruent (48 trials) and 75% incongruent (144 trials) trials.  
Consequently, the list-wide proportion congruency for the proactive session was 33%. The 
session was divided into two blocks of 144 trials each, between which subjects were instructed to 
rest for one minute.   
Reactive Session. In the reactive session the proportion congruency manipulation was at the 
item-level - item-specific proportion congruency (IS-PC). Specifically, blue and red color-font 
items were manipulated to be PC-100 (i.e., these font-color words were only presented on 
congruent trials; 192 trials). Purple and white color-font items were manipulated to be PC-25 





proactive conditions, the remaining 96 trials were PC-50 (i.e., equal amount of congruent and 
incongruent trials). Thus, subjects completed a total of 480 trials during the reactive session. The 
session was divided into three blocks of 160 trials each, between which subjects were instructed 
to rest for one minute. 
Cognitive Control Measures. Average reaction times (RTs) on correct trials and error rates 
were calculated for both congruent and incongruent trials for each subject in each session. The 
Stroop interference effect (incongruent – congruent) in both RT and also error rate was 
calculated separately for biased items and PC-50 items.  
7.3.2 AX-CPT  
The AX-CPT (see Figure 2) has become increasingly utilized as a task of context 
processing and cognitive control, given its simplicity, flexibility, and applicability in a wide-range 
of populations. In these variants of the AX-CPT, subjects make button press responses to visually 
presented cue-probe pairs. A target key press (“/”) is made to the probe on AX trials; a non-target 
key press (“.”) is made to the probe on the other non-target (AY, BX, BY) trials, and to the cue on 
all trials. In addition to the four primary trial types, the task also includes no-go trials which require 
withholding response to the probe and are indicated by a digit (1-9) rather than letter probe. The 
task comprised 216 trials total, and included 72 AX trials, 72 BY trials, 18 AY trials, 18 BX trials 
and 36 no-go trials (18 following an A-cue, 18 following a B-cue). All trial types and no-go trials 
were presented in random order. The task was performed in three 72 trial blocks, between which 
subjects were instructed to take a minimum of 1-minute rest break. All trials consisted of the 
following parameters. The cue was presented centrally on a white screen for 500 msec duration. 
After a 4000 msec blank cue-probe interval, the target (in same size font) was presented for 500 





A 1500 msec inter-trial interval ended the trial (indicated by a central triangle of fixation crosses). 
In all of the current AX-CPT variants tested in this battery, the task structure, trial types and 
frequencies are identical, except for the specific manipulations for proactive and reactive 
conditions described in the next section. 
Manipulation Rationale. First, all three variants include no-go trials, in which the probe is a digit 
rather than letter. Because of the increase in response uncertainty (i.e., three types of probe 
response are possible: target, non-target, no-go), the addition of no-go trials decreases the overall 
predictive utility of cue information for responding, and as a consequence was found to reduce 
overall proactive control bias typically observed in healthy young adults. As such the no-go trials 
result in a “low control” baseline, which can be contrasted and used to observe variant-related 
changes in control mode (Gonthier et al., 2016).  
The proactive condition replicates prior work using context strategy training to increase 
predictive preparation of responses following contextual cue information (Gonthier et al., 2016). 
Specifically, subjects are provided with explicit information regarding the ratios of these cue-
probe associations, and receive training and practice in utilizing them to prepare the dominant 
responses. In addition, during inter-trial intervals, subjects are provided with visual instructions 
to “remember to use the strategy”. The key prediction is that the increased utilization of 
contextual cue information will lead to a bias to prepare a target response following an A-cue 
(analyzed in terms of both AX and AY trials) and a non-target response following a B-cue, 
leading to reduced interference on BX trials, but a side effect of which will be increased errors 






The reactive condition involved a new manipulation which has not previously been 
examined. Specifically, the reactive condition utilizes item-specific probe cueing; for high 
control demand trials (i.e., AY, BX, no-go) the probe item appears in a distinct spatial location, 
and with a distinct border color surrounding it (presented briefly before the onset of the probe). 
Critically, because these featural associations only form at the time of probe onset, they were not 
hypothesized to modulate the utilization of proactive control strategies. Likewise, the probe 
features could not drive direct stimulus-response learning, since they did not directly indicate the 
appropriate response to be made (i.e., either a non-target or no-go response could be required). In 
contrast, the probe features can serve as cues signaling high control demand, and thus prompt 
more rapid and effective retrieval of contextual information to resolve the conflict. Because 
information about high-conflict probe features is not provided explicitly to subjects (in contrast 
to the proactive condition), it has to be learned implicitly through experience. The key prediction 
is that utilization of probe features should reduce the tendency to make BX errors, but could 
increase BX reaction time interference (due to the tendency to utilize the probe to drive context 
retrieval). 
Baseline Session. The baseline session identically followed the description above. After 
receiving task instructions, subjects performed a 12-trial practice block before beginning the 
actual task.   
Proactive Session. In the proactive condition, subjects received strategy training before 
completing the AX-CPT. The strategy training occurred during a practice block of 6 trials, 
during which an audio clip was played, which instructed subjects which button to prepare 
following the cue. After this first series of practice trials, subjects performed a second practice 





response to the second item. Subjects typed out “left” or “right” and the program told subjects if 
they were correct or not. If they were not correct, they were reminded what letter the first item 
was and asked to try again. This procedure was implemented to accommodate the on-line testing 
format, and deviated slightly from in-person versions, in which subjects responded verbally 
regarding the button they were preparing to press. Additionally, during the test phase, in the 
inter-trial interval periods, subjects were given the visual message to “Use the strategy!”.  
Otherwise, task structure was identical to the baseline session.   
Reactive Session. The occurrence of high conflict trials (AY, BX, no-go) was implicitly signaled 
by presenting the probe in a distinct spatial location and preceded by a distinct border color.  
Specifically, while cues were always presented centrally (as in the baseline and proactive 
conditions) the probe stimuli were either presented in the upper half (AX, BY) or lower half 
(AY, BX, no-go) of the visual display. Furthermore, probe stimuli were immediately preceded 
(250 msec before probe onset) by either a white border (AX, BY) or red border (AY, BX, no-
go). Otherwise, the task structure and trial proportions were identical to baseline and proactive 
sessions.   
Cognitive Control Measures. Average reaction times (RTs) on correct trials and error rates 
were calculated for each of the 4 primary trial types (AX, AY, BX, BY) for each subject in each 
session. Average error rates for no-go trials were calculated as well. Additional derived indices 
were also computed: A-cue bias, d’-context, the Proactive Behavioral Index (PBI), and BX probe 
Interference (Gonthier et al., 2016). The first two indices, A-cue bias, and d’-context are based 
on signal detection theory, (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) and reflect the use of proactive control. 
The A-cue bias measure was calculated by computing a c criterion from hits on AX trials and 





representing false alarms on AY trials (Richmond et al., 2015). The d’-context index was 
calculated by computing a d’ index from hits on AX trials and false alarms on BX trials as Z(H) 
– Z(F), with H representing hits on AX trials, F representing false alarms on BX trials, and Z 
representing the z-transform of a value. The third index was the PBI, calculated as (AY – 
BX)/(AY + BX) (Braver et al., 2009). This index reflects the relative balance of interference 
between AY and BX trials; a positive PBI reflects higher interference on AY trials, indicating 
proactive control, whereas a negative PBI reflects higher interference on BX trials, indicating 
reactive control. The PBI was computed separately for error rates (based on average error rates 
on AY and BX trials) and for RTs (based on average RTs on AY and BX trials). The fourth 
index was BX probe interference, calculated as (BX – BY) on both error rates and RTs, 
including a standardized RT computation. This index allows for examination of the interference 
that occurs when an “X” probe follows a non-target cue “A” and a target trial response must be 
inhibited. In order to correct for error rates that were equal to 0, a log-linear correction was 
applied to all error rate data prior to computing the d’-context, the A-cue bias, PBI, and BX 
interference (Braver et al., 2009; Hautus, 1995). This correction was applied as  
error + 0.5/N.obs. + 1 
7.3.3 Cued Task Switching  
In the current Cued-TS paradigm (see Figure 2), we used the letter-digit task, which 
involves bivalent target stimuli consisting of a letter and a digit (e.g., E3). On each trial the 
subject is cued to perform either a letter task – consonant/vowel discrimination – or a digit task – 
odd/even discrimination. For the letter task, consonants required right key press (“L”) and 
vowels required a left key press (“A”).  For the digit task, even numbers required a right (“L”) 





cued by an on-screen message that indicates either “ATTEND LETTER” or “ATTEND 
NUMBER”, indicating whether attention and responding should be based on the letter or digit, 
respectively. Critically, because of the response mappings, certain stimuli are congruent, in that 
they require the same key press irrespective of the relevant task rule (e.g., H6, E3), while other 
stimuli are incongruent, in that the two tasks were associated with different required responses to 
the same target (e.g., I6, D4).  
The target stimuli were constructed in terms of two distinct stimulus sets. One set of 
stimuli (A1, A2, B1, B2, 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B) were kept mostly congruent (80% congruent; 20% 
incongruent). The second set of stimuli (D4, E3, H5, I6, 4D, 3E, 5H, I6) were unbiased (50% 
congruent, 50% congruent). Trials randomly alternated between an equal number of “ATTEND 
LETTER” and “ATTEND NUMBER” trials. Due to the random presentation order of the cues, 
switch and repeat trials were on average equivalent, but deviated slightly in number across 
conditions and subjects. Each session consisted of 192 total trials, 96 mostly congruent (80 
congruent, 16 incongruent) and 96 unbiased (48 congruent, 48 incongruent) and also equally 
split between the two tasks (i.e., 96 letter, 96 digit). Trials were separated into three 64 trial 
blocks, between which subjects were required to take a minimum of 1-minute rest break. Prior to 
starting each session subjects learned (or refreshed their memory) of these response mappings 
through a set of 16 practice trials. All trials consisted of the following stimulus parameters: trial 
initiation with a 300 msec alerting cue (flashing cross), followed by the task cue presented on a 
gray screen for 500 msec duration. After a 3500 msec blank cue-target interval, the target was 
presented until a response was made. The response was followed by a 1250 msec feedback 





Manipulation Rationale. An important metric of cognitive control in task-switching paradigms 
is the task rule congruency effect (TRCE), which refers to the increased interference (both errors 
and reaction time) when the target response required for the current task is incongruent with the 
response that would be required to the same target stimulus if the alternative task had been cued. 
In the baseline condition, target stimuli are list-wide mostly congruent (67%), as prior work has 
found that mostly congruent conditions result in a large and robust TRCE (Bugg & Braver, 
2016). The proactive condition follows Bugg and Braver (2016) in keeping the same list-wide 
mostly congruent structure as the baseline condition, but adding reward incentives on a subset of 
trials. Specifically, on 33% of trials, reward cues are presented simultaneously with advance task 
cues (i.e., by presenting the task cue in green font), and indicate the opportunity to earn monetary 
bonuses if performance is accurate and fast (relative to baseline performance) on that trial. By 
only presenting reward cues on a subset of trials, the remaining subset of non-incentivized trials 
and target stimuli can be directly compared across the proactive and baseline conditions. The key 
prediction is that enhanced proactive control will lead to a global improvement of performance 
(i.e., faster RTs while maintaining accuracy). 
The reactive condition utilizes a new manipulation which has not previously been 
examined in prior work. Specifically, the reactive condition includes punishment (rather than 
reward) incentives, again on the same 33% subset of trials that were incentivized in the proactive 
condition. However, in the reactive condition the incentive cue is presented at the time of the 
target stimulus, rather than with the task cue, which prevents the use of incentive motivation in a 
preparatory fashion. Subjects are instructed that they will lose a component of their potential 
monetary bonus if they make an error on these incentivized trials. Critically, the incentivized 





associate punishment-related motivation with these high-conflict items, potentially leading to 
increased response monitoring and caution when incongruence is detected. As such, the key 
prediction is that enhanced reactive control should reduce the TRCE, even on the non-
incentivized trials, when compared to baseline and proactive conditions. 
Baseline Session. In this condition, no manipulations were made to the unbiased stimuli.  
However, to maintain consistency with the proactive and reactive sessions described below, for 
these stimuli task cues and target stimuli could appear in either red or green font. However, this 
distinction was irrelevant with regard to the instructions given subjects.  
Proactive Session. The proactive variant of Cued-TS was identical to the baseline variant except 
for the addition of a reward-based motivational incentive. This motivational incentive provides 
subjects with a reward cue indicated during presentation of the task cue. When subjects 
responded to incentive trials faster than the baseline session’s median RT while maintaining 
accuracy (this information was stored in a look-up table database, and accessed at the beginning 
of each session), they received a monetary bonus for that trial added to their compensation 
amount. Before the start of the proactive sessions, subjects were given the following instructions: 
“from here to end, you can obtain more payment on top of regular compensation by responding 
faster than before and maintaining accuracy. A green cue will let you know if you are performing 
a trial where you can obtain a larger reward.” Non-incentive trials indicated by the task cue 
appearing in red font, while incentive trials were indicated by the task cue appearing in green 
font. Only the unbiased set of stimuli were incentivized (66% of unbiased, 33% of total, 64 
trials) and presentation order was random with respect to the task cue and target stimuli pre-
determined pairs.  Subjects received feedback on all trials. The word “Reward!” appeared on the 





incorrect response, the words “Too Slow!” or “Incorrect!”, respectively, appeared on the screen. 
The non-incentive trials also included feedback, showing “Correct” or “Incorrect” after each 
trial. 
Reactive Session. The reactive variant of Cued-TS was identical to the baseline variant except 
for the addition of a punishment-based motivational incentive. This motivational incentive 
provides subjects with a punishment cue indicated during presentation of the target. When 
subjects made errors on incentive trials, they received a monetary penalty for that trial that was 
subtracted from their compensation amount. Before the start of the reactive sessions, subjects 
were given the following instructions: “from here to end, you can obtain lose money from your 
regular compensation by making errors. A green cue will let you know if you are performing a 
trial where you might receive a penalty.” Non-incentive trials indicated by the target stimulus 
appearing in red font, while incentive trials were indicated by the target stimulus appearing in 
green font. Only the unbiased set of stimuli were incentivized, and these were applied in an item-
specific manner such that all of the incongruent stimuli (H5, 6I, 5H, 6I; 48 trials) were 
incentivized while only 33% of the congruent stimuli were associated with incentives (D4, E3, 
3E, 4D; 16 trials). The sentence “Loss of 25 cents!” appeared on the screen for 1250 ms if the 
subject made an incorrect response. If subjects were correct or were too slow, or the words 
“Correct” or “Too Slow!” respectively, appeared on the screen. The non-incentive trials also 
included feedback, showing “Correct” or “Incorrect” after each trial. 
Cognitive Control Measures. Average reaction times (RTs) on correct trials and error rates 
were calculated separated by congruent/incongruent for the biased items, for each subject in each 





TRCE (Task Rule Congruency Effect) is calculated as a difference score between incongruent 
and congruent trials and was computed for biased and incentive items separately.  
7.3.4 Sternberg  
In the current Sternberg item-recognition task (SIRT; see Figure 2), subjects are 
presented with a list of words on each trial that serves as a memory set (e.g., “WINE”, “SPLIT”, 
“GRILL”, “INTENT”). After an encoding period and a retention interval delay, a probe item is 
presented, which requires a judgment as to whether it was part of the current trial’s memory set 
(i.e., a positive probe) or not (i.e., a negative probe). Specifically, the probe could be: (a) a novel 
positive word (NP), (b) a novel negative word (NN), or (c) a recent negative word (RN). Where 
the novel condition indicates an “until-then” unpresented word and the recent condition an word 
that was presented in a previous set. The current variants of the SIRT were constructed using two 
distinct sets of memory items: critical items had a constant memory set of 5 words; and a 
variable-load set which consisted of either low-load items (memory sets of 2-4 words) or high-
load items (memory sets of 6-8 words).  
Each session consisted of 120 total trials, broken down into 48 critical items, and 72 
variable-load items. Trials were separated into three 40 trial blocks, between which subjects were 
required to take a minimum of 1-minute rest break. Prior to starting each session subjects learned 
(or refreshed their memory) of the task through a set of 10 practice trials. All trials consisted of 
the following stimulus parameters: visual presentation of the memory set across two encoding 
screens each of 2000 msec duration; in the first screen, were presented above a central fixation 
cross, and in the second screen, below the cross. Following memory set presentation, a retention 
interval of 4000 msec was presented (during which the fixation cross remained on screen), 





Manipulation Rationale. The Sternberg item-recognition task has been one of the most popular 
experimental paradigms used to assess short-term/working memory for over 50 years (Sternberg, 
1966) but more recently has been adapted particularly for the study of cognitive control with the 
“recent probes” version (Jonides & Nee, 2006). In recent probes versions, the key manipulation 
is that the probe item can also be a part of the memory set of the previous trial, but not the 
current trial, which is termed a “recent negative” (RN) probe. On these RN trials, the probe is 
associated with high familiarity, which can increase response interference and errors, unless 
cognitive control is utilized to successfully determine that the familiarity is a misleading cue 
regarding probe status (target or non-target). The current variants of the Sternberg WM included 
in the battery are adapted from Burgess & Braver (2010) in using manipulations of WM load 
expectancy and RN frequency.  
Specifically, in the baseline condition, most trials have high WM load (6-8 items; 60%) 
and RN frequency is low (20% of non-target probes), which should reduce tendencies to engage 
either proactive or reactive control strategies. However, in the proactive condition, most trials 
have low WM load (2-4 items; 60%), leading to the expectancy that active maintenance-focused 
and proactive attentional strategies will be effective, while RN frequency remains low (matched 
at 20% non-target probes), such that the utility of reactive control should be unchanged. The 5-
item set size occurs equivalently in all conditions (40% of trials), and thus can be used to 
compare performance across different control mode conditions. The key prediction is that use of 
proactive control strategies, will improve both RT and accuracy, primarily for the target probe 
items (termed novel positive, or NP, since they never overlap across trials).   
In the reactive condition, WM loads are identical to the baseline condition (i.e., high-load), while 





condition, it is familiarity-based interference expectancy that increases, rather than WM load 
expectancy. Based on the increased interference-expectancy, the theoretical hypothesis is that 
subjects will not rely on familiarity as a cue for responding, and will rather evaluate the match of 
the probe to items stored in WM. Consequently, the key prediction is that performance on RN (or 
rather the RN effect, the difference in performance between RN and NN trials) will be 
significantly improved relative to baseline. 
Baseline Session. The baseline session involved high-load variable-items and a low proportion 
of RN trials (20% of negative probes, 10% of total trials). Specifically, the variable-load set 
consisted of a mixture of high-load memory sets (12 6-item, 24 7-item, 36 8-item) and very few 
RN trials (4 RN, 32 NN, 36 NP).  For the critical 5-item set, the proportion was slightly adjusted, 
to increase the number of RN trials for analysis (8 RN, 16 NN, 24 NP). 
Proactive Session. In the proactive session, the variable-load items were instead a mixture of 
low-load memory sets (36 2-item, 24 3-item, 12 4-item). The proportion of RN, NN, and NP 
trials was identical to the baseline session for both variable-load (4 RN, 32 NN, 36 NP) and 
critical item sets (8 RN, 16 NN, 24 NP).  
Reactive Session. In the reactive session, the variable-load set used the identical mixture of 
high-load memory set items as the baseline session (12 6-item, 24 7-item, 36 8-item). However, 
the relative proportion of RN to NN trials was increased in both the variable-load (32 RN, 4 NN, 
36 NP) and critical items (16 RN, 8 NN, 24 NP).  
Cognitive Control Measures. Separate analyses were conducted for critical items (N = 5) and 
other variable-load items collapsing across load level. Average reaction times (RTs) on correct 





non-critical items. One additional index, the recency effect, was also calculated for both RTs and 
error rates as a difference score on negative trials as RN trials – NN trials.  
7.4 Data Pre-Processing 
To facilitate comparison of results across task paradigms, subjects who failed to complete 
all six sessions were not included in the analyses reported here; data from 128 subjects entered 
the pre-processing stage. The remaining data were conservatively pre-processed in two steps: (1) 
removal of extreme outliers, and (2) winsorization of remaining outliers. In step 1, all 128 
subjects were screened for abnormalities such as extremely slow RTs or high error rates. RT 
plots were examined and cutoff decisions were made for each task separately. Trials with RTs 
slower than the cutoff threshold were discarded. The threshold for Stroop was 4000 ms; no RTs 
on correct trials surpassed the threshold. The threshold for AX-CPT was 2000 ms; no RTs on 
correct trials surpassed the threshold. The threshold for Cued Task-Switching was 5000 ms and 
resulted in 0.3% of the task’s data discarded. The threshold for Sternberg was 3000 ms; no RTs 
on correct trials surpassed the threshold. After discarding trials with these RT outliers, the 
number of trials per condition remained sufficient for analyses. Finally, all subjects in all 
sessions had a subject-level error rate below 40%; this cutoff is based on Gonthier et al. (2016). 
No subjects were discarded based on this first step. 
In step 2, a winsorization procedure was conducted on RT data at the trial level (i.e., data 
split by phase, session, trial type, and subject). The winsorization parameters for RTs were as 
follows: RTs lower than 200 ms were replaced by RTs of 200 ms and RTs above the mean plus 3 
standard deviations were replaced by RTs of the mean plus 3 standard deviations. Across the 
four tasks 1.9% of RT observations were adjusted by the procedure. The adjustments did not 





was conducted at the level of trial type (data split by phase, session, subject, and trial type), 
instead of at the subject level, which was examined in the first step of pre-processing. Following 
the cutoff used by Gonthier et al. (2016), error rates above 40% were replaced with error rates of 
40%. This resulted in nearly 5% of error rates being adjusted for the AX-CPT and Sternberg 
tasks (i.e., 4.78%, 4.69%, respectively). The Stroop and Cued Task-Switching adjustments were 
much lower at .07% and 1.69%, respectively. Examining this more carefully revealed repeated 
subpar performance for some subjects (e.g., consistently greater than 80% error rate, large 
proportion of observations without responses) which inflated the winsorization adjustment rates. 
Those subjects were excluded from the final sample. We retained 126 subjects for Stroop, 121 
for AX-CPT, 128 for Cued Task-Switching, and 126 for Sternberg. Subjects for the between-task 
correlations were selected pairwise and depending on the task pairing resulted in either a sample 

















8.1 Traditional Analyses  
Broadly, the goal of the first set of analyses is to examine whether task manipulations 
based on a theory or framework that explains individual-level variability improves individual 
differences reliability. The DMC task battery was created to this end and here we report the 
individual differences reliability of the measures taken from its four tasks with its variants (e.g., 
baseline, proactive, reactive). Importantly, the following results only include the critical 
conditions of the tasks (i.e., Stroop biased condition, task-switching biased condition, Sternberg 
list-length 5 condition). The critical conditions were designed specifically to allow for 
comparison across tasks. Descriptive statistics and experimental results by session, task, and trial 
type are reported in Tang et al. (2021).  
8.1.1 Reliability Estimates 
Internal consistency estimates were calculated as permutation-based split-half 
correlations. The data were repeatedly (5000 permutations) and randomly split into halves, which 
were then correlated and a Spearman-Brown correction was applied. The estimates reported here 
are an average of those 5000 corrected correlations. Test-retest reliabilities were calculated as 
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) using a two-way random-effects model of the single-
rater type and absolute agreement (i.e., ICC2,1, Shrout and Fleiss (1979)). Because practice 
effects to are expected to occur from session to session and from test to retest, the ICC 
relationship parameter was set to absolute agreement. This form is sensitive to changes in the 
mean between repeated measures. For ease of interpretation, estimates of reliability below .50 
are considered poor; between .50 and .75 are considered moderate; between .75 and .90 are 





thresholds are somewhat arbitrary; they are offered here as a guide. Of course, the qualitative 
description of reliability is not a substitute for understanding the numerical estimate in its 
context. 
Difference Score Estimates. Due to the large number of measures, all reliability 
estimates are presented in Appendix A (Tables A1-A6). There, a full report includes internal 
consistency and test-retest reliabilities for the aggregate measures (mean RT, error rate) for all 
trial types, across all tasks and sessions. The main focus here is whether the DMC battery, by 
introducing theoretically motivated task manipulations, yields reliable measures of cognitive 
control difference scores. Although the aggregate measures are briefly discussed, only the 
difference score results are presented here. Figure 3 shows both the split-half and test-retest 
reliability estimates across sessions (baseline, proactive, reactive) for each task paradigm (2x3x4 







Reaction Time Split-half and Test-Retest Reliability Estimates of DMC Task Battery Difference Scores
 
Note. Split-half estimates are permutation-based split-half correlations, test-retest estimates are intraclass correlation coefficients 







Error Rate Split-half and Test-Retest Reliability Estimates of DMC Task Battery Difference Scores 
 
Note. Split-half estimates are permutation-based split-half correlations, test-retest estimates are intraclass correlation coefficients 





As expected, the reliabilities of difference score measures are weaker than the reliabilities 
of aggregate measures. For example, the split-half reliability for Stroop incongruent RT is .99, 
Stroop congruent RT is .99, but the reliability of the Stroop RT effect is .55. The same general 
pattern is observed for the test-retest reliability estimates; test-retest for Stroop incongruent RT is 
.90, Stroop congruent RT is .93, but the reliability of the Stroop RT effect is .32. This pattern is 
observed across all tasks, for both split-half and test-retest reliability estimates. Because most 
indices of cognitive control are based on difference scores, this is of serious concern.  
Furthermore, the Sternberg recency effect measure is unreliable across the board, for both 
RT and error rate. The poor reliability and high variability of the Sternberg estimates may stem 
from research design (i.e., low number of observations available to calculate a difference score). 
To induce proactive control, recent negative (RN) trials were presented infrequently in the 
baseline and proactive sessions, with only 8 RN trials per subject. Calculating a difference score 
from the current Sternberg paradigm for the use of individual differences research is therefore 
not advised.  
The results for Stroop, AX-CPT, and task-switching are mixed. The split-half estimates 
indicate moderate to good reliability, for both RT and error rate (.52 – .88; with the exception of 
3 weaker values). However, the test-retest estimates indicate poor reliability (.15 – .55; with a 
single .78 outlier). Unfortunately, the session level manipulations (proactive/reactive) did not 
produce demonstrative improvements in reliability. Although reliability was generally highest in 
the reactive session, the overlapping confidence intervals across sessions suggests that this is not 
a robust effect. 
Overall, the reliability results are somewhat disappointing. The DMC task battery was 





The battery was largely a success with respect to the experimental manipulations; proactive and 
reactive shifts in cognitive control were observed and replicated in each task paradigm (Tang et 
al., 2021; see also Gonthier et al., 2016). However, the current results suggest that the DMC task 
battery is not as successful when it comes to reliable measurement of individual differences in 
cognitive control. That said, the difference between split-half and test-retest estimates of 
reliability is intriguing and may provide some insight into the measurement of cognitive control; 
we discuss this finding in more detail in the discussion section.   
AX-CPT Derived Indices Estimates. Four additional indices were derived for the AX-
CPT: the signal detection indices d′ and A-cue bias, and RT and error rate Proactive Behavioral 
Index (PBI). The reliability of these derived indices reveals a similar pattern as the difference 
score measures; the split-half reliability estimates are stronger than test-retest estimates (see 
Figure 5). In contrast, two novel and interesting patterns emerged. First, all four proactive 
session derived indices are internally consistent, with split-half estimates ranging from .78–.81. 
Second, split-half estimates for d′ exceeded .75 in all sessions and thus is considered to be 
internally consistent as well. This suggest that the reliability of the d′ and the proactive indices 






Split-half and Test-Retest Reliability Estimates of AX-CPT Derived Indices 
 
Note. Split-half estimates are permutation-based split-half correlations, test-retest estimates are intraclass correlation coefficients 






An important follow-up is the examination of how reliability affects correlations between 
the tasks. Theoretical conclusions are made from the magnitude of correlations, not from 
reliabilities. Of course, one should consider the latter when interpreting the former. For between-
task correlations it is important to choose the correct type of correlation coefficient. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient has essentially become the default. However, for some designs other types 
of correlation coefficients are preferable.  
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, or Pearson’s r, assumes that the relationship between 
two variables is both monotonic and linear (among other assumptions). The relationship between 
RT and error rate indices of cognitive-behavioral tasks is often monotonic, but not necessarily 
linear (Hedge, Powell, Bompas, 2018). Hence, Spearman’s rho (ρ) is a good non-parametric 
substitute for the parametric Pearson’s r. In addition, Spearman developed the disattenuated 
correlation coefficient (ρdis; Spearman, 1904). This provides an estimation of the maximal 
attainable correlation by correcting for measurement noise. Hence, by comparing ρ and ρdis one 
can examine the influence of reliability on correlations.  
In total, we observed 198 between-task correlations. Most of the correlations are weak (ρ 
< .40; Dancey & Reidy, 2004), but some approached moderate strength (ρ => .40). In Table 1 we 
highlight 22 between-task Spearman’s rho correlations exceeding a magnitude of .20. For these 
analyses, the test and retest data were combined to address the low number of observations in 
some conditions, with the added benefit that it maximizes power. Complete correlation tables per 
session are available in Appendix B (Tables B1–B3). For comparison; the corresponding 







Table 1  
Selected Between-Task Spearman Correlations with Magnitude Larger than .20.  
Index 1 Index 2 Session ρ ρdis 95% CI (ρ) n 
A-cue Bias Stroop Error Baseline -.27 -.54* [-.430, -.098] 120 
 Stroop Error Proactive -.32* -.53** [-.481, -.160] 120 
 Stroop Error Reactive -.24 -.35† [-.403, -.065] 120  
TRCE Error Baseline .24 .44† [.061, .398] 122 
 TRCE Error Reactive .23 .44† [.056, .393] 122 
BXI Error  Stroop Error Reactive -.32* -.40** [-.468, -.144] 120 
 Stroop RT Proactive -.31* -.51** [-.468, -.144] 120 
 Stroop RT Reactive -.26 -.33* [-.421, -.087] 120  
TRCE Error Reactive .23 .38† [.053, .390] 122 
BXI RT TRCE Error Reactive .20 .34 [.029, .370] 122 
d′ Stroop Error Baseline -.26 -.44* [-.430, -.098] 120 
 Stroop Error Proactive -.33* -.54** [-.480, -.160] 120 
 Stroop Error Reactive -.37** -.44*** [-.511, -.199] 120 
 Stroop RT Proactive -.28† -.41* [-.433, -.100] 120 
 Stroop RT Reactive -.28 -.34* [-.432, -.099] 120 
 TRCE Error Baseline .23 .36† [.060, .396] 122 
 TRCE Error Reactive .30* .47** [.136, .459] 122 
PBI Error Stroop Error Reactive .34** .45** [.167, .486] 120 
 Stroop RT Baseline .20 .28 [.020, .364] 120 
 Stroop RT Reactive .23 .31† [.058, .398] 120 
Stroop Error TRCE RT Baseline -.23 -.55† [-.393, -.053] 120 
Stroop RT TRCE RT Proactive .20 .32 [.019, .364] 120 
Note. CI = confidence interval; ρ = Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient; ρdis = Spearman’s rank 
disattenuated correlation coefficient; BXI = BX Interference; PBI = Proactive Behavioral Index; TRCE = 
Task Rule Congruency Effect; Recency = recency effect. Test and retest phase combined.  
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
 
Out of the 22 moderate correlations, seven were statistically significant at the α = .05 
level, with magnitudes ranging between .30 – .37. Six of these were between indices of the AX-
CPT and the Stroop effect, with the remaining significant correlation being between AX-CPT d′ 





manipulated sessions (i.e., proactive and reactive sessions) but the low number (7 out of 198 total 
correlations) prevents us from drawing any meaningful conclusions from this result. Including 
the non-significant correlations, half of the highlighted correlations are between the Stroop effect 
and a second index (e.g., A-cue bias, BX interference, d′).  
Given that only seven out of 198 correlations exceeded .30, and given that these are all 
well- established tasks, it is understandable that some researchers have concluded that cognitive 
control is simply not a coherent psychometric construct (Rey-Mermet et al., 2018). In fact, the 
median correlation (r = .13) is on par with the so-called “crud factor” in differential psychology, 
which refers to the idea that correlations with magnitudes between 0 and .20 should be 
interpreted as nothing but noise (Lykken, 1968; Meehl, 1986; but see Orben & Lakens, 2020 for 
a recent critique).  
The current study focuses on the importance of reliability when interpreting these 
correlations. As noted previously, a correlation between two measures is attenuated by the 
reliability of those two measures. Correlations are negatively affected by measurement error, 
which distorts the signal with noise. Equation 2 shows Spearman’s correction for attenuation 
(1904), which uses each measurement’s reliability (𝑟𝑥𝑥,  𝑟𝑦𝑦) as an index of that noise which 
allows for an estimation of a maximum attainable or “true” correlation (𝑟𝑥′𝑦′) by dis-attenuating 
the measurement’s correlation (𝑟𝑥𝑦). For comparison with ρ, Spearman’s dis-attenuated rho 
correlations (ρdis) are presented in Table 1 as well. It is important to note that these estimates 
should not be used to make inferences to the tasks or as evidence of their supposed underlying 
construct (Muchinsky, 1996; Winne & Belfry, 1982). Rather, we present both estimates to 
examine the role of reliability on between-task correlations, and more importantly, the theoretical 








  (2) 
The standard rho correlations in Table 1 are all considered of weak magnitude. 
Alternatively, the majority of disattenuated rho correlations reach moderate magnitude (median = 
.41). Importantly, all correlations now exceed the crud factor threshold. Furthermore, whereas 7 
out of 22 rho estimates were statistically significant, disattenuated rho revealed 12 significant 
correlations. One would be hard-pressed to interpret the magnitude of the rho correlations as 
evidence for a general underlying construct. However, the disattenuated rho correlations suggest 
that cognitive control might be a coherent psychometric construct albeit a difficult to measure 
one. 
8.1.2 Interim Discussion 
Because studies continue to use popular tasks and estimates optimized for producing 
experimental effects, individual differences research in cognitive control progresses only slowly. 
This perpetuates measurement issues as described here, and by others (see Hedge, Powell, & 
Sumner, 2018). To address these issues, we designed a new task-battery with variants of classic 
cognitive control tasks. These variants and task manipulations were based on the DMC 
framework and were hypothesized to create new sources of between-subject variance to improve 
individual differences. Seemingly, the task battery did not improve reliability or between-task 
correlations above and beyond previous studies. Yet, from the results of the current set of 
analyses we can draw some important conclusions. 
First, even though difference scores work well to show experimental (within-subject) 
effects (Tang et al., 2021), they are unsuitable to be used as individual differences predictors. 
Our findings, which are aligned with those from other studies, indicate that even with optimal 





is a challenge to the field. As mentioned in the introduction, this is not a new phenomenon (e.g., 
Cronbach, 1957). Difference scores are consistently less reliable than its components (Appendix 
A), and nowhere near as robust as the experimental effects.  
Second, only 11.1% of the between-task correlations reported here surpassed the crud  
threshold (r = |.20|). More importantly, we show that correlations disattenuated from their 
reliability bottleneck do reach acceptable levels. Hence, conclusions, or even suggestions, based 
on correlational results stemming from unreliable indices are themselves unreliable and should 
be treated as such.  
Third, reliability is an important metric that needs to be estimated thoughtfully and 
reported routinely. There are many ways to estimate reliability, but only a few that are 
appropriate when taking task design and statistical assumptions in consideration. Our results 
show that split-half reliabilities are stronger than its respective test-retest reliabilities. This may 















8.2 Hierarchical Bayesian Analyses  
The goal of the second set of analyses is to further examine the test-retest reliability 
(TRR) of cognitive control tasks from a different statistical perspective. As shown in the first set 
of analyses, we were not able to extract reliable individual differences from experimental task 
difference score measures. Some research suggests that an alternative statistical approach is 
needed to address a large flaw with traditional approaches (e.g., those used in the first set of 
analyses), namely, that they do not model trial-to-trial variability but use mean point-estimates 
(MPE) as a representative indicator of performance (Haines et al., 2020; Lee & Webb, 2005; 
Rouder & Haaf, 2019; Rouder & Lu, 2005). In these studies, hierarchical modeling is proposed 
as an alternative to traditional methods (see also von Bastian et al., 2020). Hierarchical modeling 
is a statistical framework for modeling data that have a natural hierarchical structure. For 
example, cognitive-behavioral data that has trials within subjects and subjects within in groups 
(Gelman et al., 2013). Furthermore, some research (e.g., Rouder & Haaf, 2019; von Bastian et 
al., 2020) have presented evidence that aggregating performance across trials attenuates 
reliability, which can be resolved by implementing hierarchical methods that allow for the 
modeling of trial-to-trial variability (i.e., individual-level standard deviation), in addition to the 
traditional averaged group-level performance.  
There are other negative implications of the traditional MPE approach in analyzing 
cognitive-behavioral data. For example, Rouder and Haaf (2019) stress that the portability of a 
measurement instrument is “dramatically” overestimated in cognitive-behavioral tasks when 
using MPE. Portability indicates that measurement properties (e.g., reliability, effect size) of a 
testing instrument do not change drastically when measuring across varying samples sizes (e.g., 





obtain an underlying population value that invariably emerges, regardless of experimental design 
and sample sizes. For example, one lab runs an experiment with 50 subjects each completing 50 
trials in x conditions. Another lab runs the “same” experiment with 100 subjects each completing 
25 trials in x conditions. If measurement properties (e.g., reliability, effect size) belong to the 
experiment, then we expect the measurement indices to be the same across labs (i.e., a portable 
experiment). If the measurement properties belong to the sample, then we expect measurement 
indices to differ.  
Rouder and Haaf (2019), and Haines et al., (2020), show through simulations that 
reliability and effect size have a positive relationship with both number of trials presented and 
sample size in three common cognitive-behavioral tasks (i.e., Stroop, flanker, implicit 
association task). Furthermore, it is common that researchers alter an existing experiment to fit 
their testing needs, such as decreasing number of trials presented per subject. Given that common 
cognitive-behavioral tasks are importable, the MPE approach falsely assumes portability of those 
tasks where it should not.  
Haines et al., (2020) focus on other important implications of using MPE. In the social 
sciences it is common practice to specify a behavioral model that tests a verbal or conceptual 
theory. For example, Stroop (1935) theorized that when two properties of a stimulus (e.g., 
physical (color ink) and semantic (color word)) are incongruent, there is a penalty in both 
reaction time and accuracy performance when compared to a stimulus with congruent properties. 
Equation 3 shows the behavioral model of the reaction time Stroop effect, indexed by i indicating 
the effect is calculated for each participant. The behavioral model is then tested through 
statistical inference with data from the task paradigm. Traditionally, inference involves two 





components of an effect (e.g., a difference score), and (2)  statistical models (e.g., multiple 
regression, t-test) are fitted using these averaged effects. This two-stage approach is generally 
sufficient for detecting reliable experimental effects. However, the lack of information about 
individual-level response patterns by aggregating trial-level data into MPE, renders such an 
approach unsuitable for individual differences for two main reasons.  
Stroop𝑖 =  RT𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 −  RT𝑖,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 (3) 
First, the behavioral model in equation 3, which is among the most common, ignores 
individuals’ trial-to-trial variability. This variability reflects important behavioral information; a 
negative relationship has been found between reaction time variability and working memory 
capacity, and mind-wandering frequency influences this variability as well (McVay & Kane, 
2011). Second, the behavioral model in equation 3 does not consider what type of distribution 
this mean parameter belongs to. Researchers using this behavioral model implicitly assume a 
normal distribution, where the MPE is the most probable, and hence treated as a representative 
estimate of the underlying mental process (as a visual aid, see the normal distribution in Figure 
6). However, response distributions based on reaction time are rarely normal, but rather heavily 
right-skewed (Hockley & Corballis, 1982), or modeled as exponential Gaussian (Moscoso del 
Prado, 2008). Figure 6 shows five different possible distributions that generate an MPE value of 
3. Each distribution could imply a different behavioral mechanism generating the data, yet all 
produce the same MPE. A practical example of this using the Stroop: Heathcote and colleagues 
(1991) provide evidence that ignoring distribution shape in analyses can obscure behavioral 
mechanisms. In their study, modeling Stroop reaction time data using MPE-based difference 





exponential Gaussian distribution revealed a facilitation effect on congruent trials in addition to 
the Stroop interference effect.  
To summarize, models solely described by a MPE limit possible inferences about 
processes underlying behavior that vary between individuals. Theoretically important aspects of 
behavior can be inferred from parameters like variance (Johnson & Busemeyer, 2005), 
bimodality distribution shapes (Kvam, 2019), or skewness of the distribution (Kvam & 
Busemeyer, 2020; Leth-Steensen et al., 2000). It logically follows that models should reflect not 
only the mechanisms behind intra-individual processes (i.e., modeling mean difference; equation 
3), but inter-individual differences in those processes as well (i.e., modeling individual-level 
variability).  
Among others, Haines et al., (2020) suggest that models should ultimately “simulate data 
consistent with true behavioral observations at the level of individual participants”, which they 
refer to as generative models. Hierarchical modeling (multilevel modeling, mixed effects 
modeling) is one framework that allows for such generative modeling. By restructuring a model 
hierarchically, it considers all subjects in two contexts; as an individual and as a contributing 
member of a group. This increases the number of available parameters from one (i.e., MPE) to 
many. The model can now distribute uncertainty that exist in the data (e.g., measurement error) 
over those multiple parameters, which results in more precise estimates at both the individual 










A Non-exhaustive Collection of Distributions with a Mean Value of 3 
 
Note. The black dashed line indicates the mean of each distribution.  
 
Hierarchical Bayesian modeling (HBM) has two main advantages over its frequentist 
alternatives. One, a hierarchical Bayesian model is specified in a single model that jointly 
captures individual- and group-level uncertainty. While subjects perform a limited number of 
trials and provide data confounded with measurement error, HBM can provide reasonable 
estimates of performance based on infinite trials (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 
1999). In turn, this solves issues of non-portability in cognitive-behavioral tasks (Rouder & Haaf, 
2019). Two, it allows for the specification of distributions and its parameters, which best fits a 





equation modeling or classical attenuation corrections (Kurdi et al., 2019; Westfall & Yarkoni, 
2016).  
8.2.1 Hierarchical Bayesian Model 
In the second set of analyses, HBM is used to generatively model the four reaction time 
difference score effects from the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMC) task battery. 
Specifically, the Stroop effect, the BX interference effect from the AX-CPT, Task Rule 
Congruency Effect (TRCE) from the cued task switching task, and the recency effect from the 
Sternberg task. Using these modeled estimates, the TRR and between-task correlations are 
examined. To facilitate the comparison across these different estimates, we limit the examination 
in the second set of analyses to a reaction time model only. This approach has the added benefit 
that a single model can be fit for all sessions within all tasks. A generative model can specified to 
encapsulate the shared assumptions among the tasks. First, reaction time cannot be negative. 
Second, reaction time responses vary around some central tendency (this is ignored with MPE). 
Third, the central tendency varies per subject. Fourth, individual-level variability varies per 
subject. And fifth, reaction time distributions from cognitive-behavioral tasks tend to be right-
skewed (Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007). Although the HBM approach works for accuracy 
measures as well, it would require a significantly different model, which is outside of the scope 
of the current project. 
As established in the previous paragraphs, it is key that the model considers trial 
variability at the individual-level, hence, the individual-level distribution is defined first, 
followed by the group-level distribution. Finally, this section will conclude with the specification 





model file are available on https://osf.io/79jgs/. A graphical representation of the model is 
included as well (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7 
A Structured Schematic Representation of the Hierarchical Model 
 
Note. i = subject; c = condition; p = phase; sd = standard deviation; µi = individual-level 
mean parameter; σi = individual-level variability parameter. 
 
1 Control corresponds to non-interference trial types (e.g., Stroop congruent, Sternberg novel negative). 




Individual-Level Parameter Model. Subject’s reaction time response distributions are 
here conceptualized as coming from a lognormal distribution, satisfying our skewed distribution 
assumption (assumption 5). The distribution is further shaped by mean and standard deviation 
parameters, which both vary per subject and between each condition (satisfying assumptions 2, 
3, and, 4). Theoretically, we do not expect the distribution parameters to vary much between the 
test and retest phase. However, for test retest reliability purposes, the model assumes unique 
distributions for each phase as well. 
RT𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Lognormal(𝜇𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 , exp(𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝)) (4) 
Formally, in equation 4, RT𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 is the observed reaction time data for subject i = {1,…, 
N}, in condition c = {control, interference}1, during phase p = {test, retest}. 
~ Lognormal(𝜇𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 , exp(𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝)) signifies that the data are drawn from a generative process 
producing a skewed distribution, shaped by a mean and standard deviation parameter for each 
subject, condition, and phase combination. A lognormal distribution has an asymmetrical spread; 
more variability is found on the right-side (i.e., slow reaction times) of the central tendency than 
the left-side (i.e., fast reaction time). Importantly, the lognormal distribution has a property that 
determines how the mean and standard deviation interact, allowing the model to fit the many 
different shapes of reaction time distributions produced by the ~ 120 subjects. Wagenmakers and 
Brown (2007) show that this property adheres to a law of [reaction] time, which states that in 
reaction time performance, the standard deviation increases linearly with the mean. In other 
words, the slower a subject’s mean reaction time, the more individual-level variability they 
show. Additionally, to ensure that the individual-level standard deviation parameters are greater 





Group-Level Parameter Model. In a hierarchical model, individual-level parameters are 
informed by group-level parameters, and vice versa. Here, the hierarchy of the model is 
constructed so that the individual-level distribution parameters from Equation 4, denoted by 
𝜇𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 , are drawn from group-level normal distributions (i.e., prior models), with 
unobserved (i.e., unknown) means and standard deviations (sd):  
𝜇𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Normal(𝜇mean,𝑐,𝑝, 𝜇sd,𝑐,𝑝)
𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Normal(𝜎mean,𝑐,𝑝, 𝜎sd,𝑐,𝑝) (5)
 
By defining these prior models, the group-level distribution allows for the pooling of 
information across subjects. Each individual-level parameters, 𝜇𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 , inform the group-
level means and standard deviations, 𝜇mean,𝑐,𝑝, 𝜇sd,𝑐,𝑝 and 𝜎mean,𝑐,𝑝, 𝜎sd,𝑐,𝑝, which in turn inform 
all other individual-level parameters. This mutual interaction creates hierarchical pooling, 
regressing the individual-level parameters towards a group mean (also called shrinkage or 
regularization), and increases the precision of Bayesian estimation (Gelman et al., 2013). 
Bayesian modeling allows for such a “joint model” specification, in which the individual-level 
and group-level parameters are estimated simultaneously. This embodies the generative 
perspective (Haines et al., 2020).  
Keen observers might remark that the group-level distributions are both modeled as 
normal. Recall that the individual-level standard deviation parameter (Equation 4; exp(𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝)) 
was exponentially transformed to force it to assume positive values only. Mathematically, when 
y has a normal distribution then the exponential function of y has a lognormal distribution. It 
follows then, that the group-level distribution modeled on the individual-level standard deviation 





Model Priors. One strength of Bayesian modeling is that we can define a prior 
probability distribution which expresses one’s prior belief about an underlying distribution of 
interest. In the sections above the reasoning for the priors have been explained. In the current 
project, the parameter estimation is rather robust to prior models, because the priors are rather 
diffuse and the sample sizes of observed data are relatively large. More about the influence of the 
priors on parameter estimation can be found in the “WAMBS” section below. 
The prior model for the group-level mean parameters were as specified as normal.  
𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Normal(0, 1)
𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Normal(0, 1) (6)
 
The prior model for the group-level standard deviations parameters were as specified as half-
normal (e.g., if y is a normal distribution, then | y | is a half-normal distribution, folded along the 
mean with the purpose of consisting of only positive values). Because the individual-level 
standard deviation parameter is exponentially transformed, the group-level distribution assumes 
only positive values. 
𝜇𝑠𝑑,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Half − Normal(0, 1)
𝜎𝑠𝑑,𝑐,𝑝 ~ Half − Normal(0, 1) (7)
 
Parameter Estimation. All model parameters were estimated with Stan (Stan 
Development Team, 2020c) through an interface in R, called RStan (Stan Development Team, 
2020b). Stan is a probabilistic programming language that includes inference algorithms for 
fitting models and making predictions. Bayesian inference for continuous variable models is 
achieved by Stan’s implementation of a more efficient and robust variant of a Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) (Carpenter et al., 2017). 





As is common, the levels within hierarchical models are strongly correlated by design 
because the group-level distributions are generated from individual-level parameters. This can 
lead to inefficient exploring of the distribution parameter space by the HMC sampler. The 
sampler still explores the entire parameter space, but extremely slowly, resulting in requiring 
many iterations for proper convergence of the models. A commonly used practice to counter this, 
is to use non-centered parameterizations (Betancourt & Girolami, 2013). Critically, these 
parameterizations do not change the model, its interpretation, nor the resulting parameter 
estimates. For computational efficiency, we followed Haines et al., (2020) in offsetting the 
individual-level parameters. For an overview of non-centered parameterization see Betancourt 
and Girolami, (2013) and Papaspiliopoulus et al., (2007); also see chapter 22.7 of the Stan User’s 
Guide (Stan Development Team, 2020a).  
Extracted Parameters. For each of the four tasks in the task battery, the model was fit 
three times (e.g., once for each session), resulting in 12 model fits. From the model fits we 
extracted three families of parameters; delta, mu, and sigma. After the parameters are estimated 
and extracted, it is straight forward to generate a difference score estimate, which shall be 
referred to as delta (i.e., ∆).  
∆𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 −  𝜇𝑖,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
∆𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 −  𝜇𝑖,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (8)
 
Furthermore, the individual-level means (i.e., 𝜇𝑖,𝑐,𝑝; referred to as mu) and standard deviations 
(i.e., 𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝; referred to as sigma) were extracted for each condition and phase. No group-level 
means or standard deviations were extracted due to the individual differences nature of this 
project. The extracted delta, mu, and sigma parameters for each task and session combination are 






Bayesian statistical approaches are becoming a popular method across different 
disciplines. The advantages of Bayesian statistics can be attractive, but naively applying 
Bayesian methods can be dangerous for interpretation of the results. Because of the additional 
complexity of the method, its programming, and the freedom of distribution and parameter 
specification, there is a list of considerations that must be made before interpreting the results. 
Fortunately, these considerations are collected in the “When to worry and how to Avoid the 
Misuse of Bayesian Statistics” checklist (WAMBS; Depaoli & van de Schoot, 2017). WAMBS 
describes potential issues that can come up before and after estimating the model, which are 
collected in a checklist format. The current project heeded the relevant warnings of the WAMBS 
checklist, which are succinctly reported next. 
There are two relevant items regarding the priors on the WAMBS checklist: do you 
understand the priors and is there a notable effect of the prior when compared with non-
informative priors. The choices for the priors are explained in the previous sections. In 
preparation for the parameter estimation, models with different theoretical plausible priors, and 
no priors at all, were run. When no priors are defined, Stan defaults all prior distribution models 
to a uniform distribution (i.e., a non-informative prior). However, because the effect of delta (i.e., 
the difference score) is small (see the Results section), and the relatively large sample size, the 
priors had a negligible impact on the results. The Stan model with no prior is included in the 
WAMBS folder on https://osf.io/79jgs/. 
A large section of the WAMBS concerns itself with the convergence of the model and 
parameter estimation. WAMBS contains two items that can be answered straight-forwardly: does 





make substantive sense. Yes, the models were run with different numbers of iterations and burn-
in phases, including twice the number of the currently used number of iterations; no convergence 
issues were found in these test runs. The posterior distribution makes substantive sense, as can be 
seen in the Results. Other convergence items are more easily answered with convergence plots; 
does the trace-plot exhibit convergence, does the histogram have enough information, and do the 
chains exhibit a strong degree of autocorrelation. All relevant convergence statistics have been 
extracted and are visually presented in the WAMBS folder on https://osf.io/79jgs/.  
8.2.3 Reliability Estimates 
Test-retest reliability (TRR) estimates for the delta parameter (i.e., difference score; 
∆𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡, ∆𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) were calculated for each task and session combination and shown in Table 2. For 
a comparison between the traditional and HBM approach, corresponding mean point-estimates 
TRRs (rMPE) are provided as well in Table 2. Importantly, TRR is calculated as a Pearson r 
correlation between the test and retest phase estimates r(∆1, ∆2). Pearson r is chosen over an 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, because much of the variance has been modeled out by the 
sigma parameter.  
Difference Score Estimates. As expected, the MPE approach indicates a poor to 
moderate test-retest reliability (x̅ = .39; see the first set of analyses as well), which is consistent 
with previous studies (e.g., Hedge, Powell, and Sumner, (2018): x̅ = .55; Chen et al., (2021): x̅ = 
.49). In contrast, the TRR for the HBM delta parameters can be classified as good to excellent, 
with the reactive session recency effect being an exception (r = .52). These results are consistent 
with Haines et al., (2020), and Rouder and Haaf (2019). The delta TRR estimates indicate that 
HBM can indeed provide reliable individual differences from cognitive control tasks, even 





TRR across session; the TRR is highest for the proactive session, as was the case with the 
intraclass correlation coefficients in the first set of analyses.  
Table 2 
Reaction Time Test-Retest Correlations of the Delta Parameter from the DMC Task Battery.  
Session Task Index r(∆1, ∆2) rMPE n 
Baseline Stroop Stroop Effect .92 .54 122 
Proactive   .98 .59 119 
Reactive   .88 .55 122 
Baseline AX-CPT BX Interference .79 .50 112 
Proactive   .93 .51 116 
Reactive   .86 .49 113 
Baseline Cued TS TRCE .81 .22 116 
Proactive   .94 .28 112 
Reactive   .90 .39 122 
Baseline Sternberg Recency Effect .77 .16 120 
Proactive   .89 .20 106 
Reactive   .52 .20 127 
Note. r(∆1, ∆2) = Pearson correlation coefficient of delta estimates obtained by Hierarchical Bayesian 
Modeling; rMPE = Pearson correlation coefficient obtained from traditional Mean Point Estimates 
approach; TS = task-switching; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect; different n sample sizes due to 
additional multivariate outlier removal.  
 
8.2.4 Between-Task Correlations 
It has been suggested that the weak between-task correlations of cognitive control 
paradigms stem from the poor reliability of the measures (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018). 
Here this suggestion is tested. In Table 3 the between-task correlations of the delta parameter are 
presented. For each estimate pair, in each session, a correlation is calculated for the test phase 
and retest phase. Additionally, the test and retest phase were also combined to follow the first set 








Reaction Time Between-Task Correlations of the Delta Parameter from the DMC Task Battery. 
Session Index 1 Index 2 rtest rretest rcombined n 
Baseline Stroop Effect BX Interference .05 .17 .10 90 
Baseline  TRCE .02 .02 .02 90 
Baseline  Recency Effect -.01 -.02 -.02 90 
Baseline BX Interference TRCE -.01 .05 .03 90 
Baseline  Recency Effect -.12 -.12 -.13 90 
Baseline TRCE Recency Effect .11 -.04 .00 90 
Proactive Stroop Effect BX Interference .01 .01 .01 76 
Proactive  TRCE .00 .02 .01 76 
Proactive  Recency Effect -.06 -.07 -.07 76 
Proactive BX Interference TRCE -.09 -.16 -.13 76 
Proactive  Recency Effect -.03 -.04 -.04 76 
Proactive TRCE Recency Effect -.12 -.13 -.13 76 
Reactive Stroop Effect BX Interference .12 .01 .08 107 
Reactive  TRCE -.09 -.10 -.09 107 
Reactive  Recency Effect .06 -.10 -.05 107 
Reactive BX Interference TRCE -.04 -.01 -.02 107 
Reactive  Recency Effect .23 .15 .22 107 
Reactive TRCE Recency Effect -.10 .00 -.04 107 
Note. rtest = Pearson r correlation at test phase; rretest = Pearson r correlation at retest phase; rcombined = 
Pearson r correlation of combined phases; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Variability in sample 
sizes due to between-task differences in acceptable performance. 
 
Despite the strong reliability of the delta parameter, the between-task correlations of the 
cognitive control measure are, yet again, on par with the so-called “crud factor” (i.e., correlations 
between -.20 and .20; see the first set of analyses). This is evidence against the suggestion that 
the weak between-task correlations of cognitive control are caused by poor reliability of its 
measures. The “strongest” between-task correlation, and the only that is not considered “crud”, 
contains the reactive session recency effect (r = .23). Interestingly, this estimate had the lowest 





excellently reliable estimates. It is important to note that the delta parameter is calculated as a 
difference score. As elaborated in the first set of analyses, difference scores are notoriously 
problematic from a psychometric perspective (Caruso, 2004; Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Lord, 
1956). The finding that hierarchical Bayesian modeling cannot improve between-task 
correlations of difference score estimates is corroborated by Rouder and Haaf (2019). 
8.2.5 Sigma 
In psychology, measuring a subject’s level of ability is often done by an estimate that 
represents their average ability. Such a mean point-estimate (MPE) is simply derived from the 
average performance on a task (e.g., mean reaction time, mean accuracy), or the mean parameter 
(e.g., 𝜇𝑖) from a modeled distribution. However, some studies have focused on the variability of 
responses rather than a response average as index of cognitive ability (e.g., Der & Deary, 2006; 
Dykiert et al., 2012; Hultsch et al., 2008; MacDonald et al., 2006; Salthouse, 2007; Stuss et al., 
2003). Each of these studies show that intra-individual variability (IIV) can reveal an important 
aspect of task performance and its underlying mental processes, namely, its consistency. Two 
subjects can have identical average performances (e.g., 700ms on incongruent Stroop trials), but 
might differ in how much they deviate from this average on a given trial (Unsworth, 2015).   
Some research has suggested that increases in IIV are related to fluctuations in cognitive 
control which can lead to lapses of attention (Duchek et al., 2009; Jackson et al., 2012; Unsworth 
et al., 2010; West et al., 2002). Such lapses of attention would manifest in the data as sporadic 
slow reaction times due to task-unrelated thoughts or very fast errors due to failure to inhibit a 
prepotent response (Unsworth et al., 2004), in other words; an increase the IIV. This view is 
supported by studies that show that subjects with low cognitive ability (i.e., working memory 





to subjects with high cognitive ability (McVay & Kane, 2011; Schmiedek et al., 2007; Unsworth 
et al., 2010, 2012). More importantly, this suggests IIV may be an important source of individual 
differences in cognitive control.  
We examine whether IIV is a general trait that manifests itself similarly across different 
tests of cognitive control. An estimate of individual-level standard deviation is a common 
dependent variable of IIV. The hierarchical Bayesian model in the current project includes such 
an estimate: 𝜎𝑖,𝑐,𝑝 (sigma). The between-task correlations of the sigma parameter for the DMC 
task battery interference (Table 4) and non-interference (Table 5) trial types are presented. 
Overall, the between-task correlations of the sigma parameter indicate that it is a better suited 
estimate of individual differences in cognitive control than the delta parameter. There are some 
intricate differences when examining the correlations across task, trial type (e.g., interference, 
non-interference), and session. To facilitate interpretation of these differences, the results are 
split between the trial type and session.  
Between-task correlations of the baseline session, interference trial type, sigma 
parameters (Table 4) are generally moderate to good (median = .49), with the exception of 
correlations that include the Stroop incongruent trial type; those are generally weak (median = 
.17). A similar pattern can be found for the proactive session sigma parameters; a median of .39, 
and .18, respectively. However, for the reactive session no such difference is found; a median of 
.25 for both correlations including and excluding the Stroop incongruent trial type. This may 
indicate that the Stroop task is too simple to pick up on individual differences in IIV; or that  it 
does not share a process that is required by the other tasks. Furthermore, there are some 





phase. However, no discernable pattern can be found; in some cases the correlations are near 
identical, in others they differ 15 points.  
Table 4 
Reaction Time Between-Task Correlations of the Interference Trial Sigma Parameter from the 
DMC Task Battery. 
Session Index 1 Index 2 rtest rretest rcombined n 
Baseline Stroop Incon. AX-CPT BX .17 .22 .20 90 
Baseline  TS Incon. .09 .23 .15 90 
Baseline  Sternberg RN .11 .12 .20 90 
Baseline AX-CPT BX TS Incon. .49 .48 .54 90 
Baseline  Sternberg RN .42 .33 .45 90 
Baseline TS Incon. Sternberg RN .34 .46 .48 90 
Proactive Stroop Incon. AX-CPT BX .12 .22 .18 76 
Proactive  TS Incon. .26 .32 .34 76 
Proactive  Sternberg RN -.01 .15 .10 76 
Proactive AX-CPT BX TS Incon. .39 .43 .48 76 
Proactive  Sternberg RN .33 .40 .45 76 
Proactive TS Incon. Sternberg RN .36 .18 .25 76 
Reactive Stroop Incon. AX-CPT BX .25 .24 .28 107 
Reactive  TS Incon. .29 .28 .35 107 
Reactive  Sternberg RN .01 .06 .05 107 
Reactive AX-CPT BX TS Incon. .31 .38 .40 107 
Reactive  Sternberg RN .26 .22 .24 107 
Reactive TS Incon. Sternberg RN .14 .25 .24 107 
Note. rtest = Pearson r correlation at test phase; rretest = Pearson r correlation at retest phase; rcombined = 
Pearson r correlation of combined phases; Stroop Incon. = Stroop incongruent trial type; Sternberg RN = 
Sternberg recent negative trial type; TS Incon.= Task-Switching incongruent trial type. Variability in 
sample sizes due to between-task differences in acceptable performance. 
 
The results of the non-interference trial type sigma parameters (Table 5) also reveal a 
difference in the between-task correlations of those including the Stroop, and those not including 
the Stroop estimates, but only in the baseline session; median = .28, and .40, respectively. For 





the correlations are more homogeneous across all tasks. Importantly, across all tasks, sessions, 
and phases, the non-interference sigma estimate has a median between-task correlation of .30. 
This is a meaningful difference when compared to the median between-task correlation of the 
delta estimate: -.01. 
Table 5 
Reaction Time Between-Task Correlations of the Non-Interference Trial Sigma Parameter from 
the DMC Task Battery. 
Session Index 1 Index 2 rtest rretest rcombined n 
Baseline Stroop Con. AX-CPT BY .21 .23 .30 90 
Baseline  TS Con. .13 .28 .22 90 
Baseline  Sternberg NN .41 .37 .44 90 
Baseline AX-CPT BY TS Con. .32 .39 .44 90 
Baseline  Sternberg NN .36 .26 .40 90 
Baseline TS Con. Sternberg NN .45 .44 .47 90 
Proactive Stroop Con. AX-CPT BY .15 .11 .14 76 
Proactive  TS Con. .32 .34 .39 76 
Proactive  Sternberg NN .20 .36 .31 76 
Proactive AX-CPT BY TS Con. .31 .31 .34 76 
Proactive  Sternberg NN .38 .34 .38 76 
Proactive TS Con. Sternberg NN .29 .25 .29 76 
Reactive Stroop Con. AX-CPT BY .29 .07 .18 107 
Reactive  TS Con. .28 .30 .34 107 
Reactive  Sternberg NN .21 .30 .34 107 
Reactive AX-CPT BY TS Con. .27 .34 .36 107 
Reactive  Sternberg NN .29 .22 .31 107 
Reactive TS Con. Sternberg NN .22 .36 .33 107 
Note. rtest = Pearson r correlation at test phase; rretest = Pearson r correlation at retest phase; rcombined = 
Pearson r correlation of combined phases; Stroop Con.= Stroop congruent trial type; TS Con.= Task-
Switching congruent trial type; Sternberg NN = Sternberg novel negative trial type. Variability in sample 









The second set of analyses replicates previous findings (Chen et al., 2021; Haines et al., 
2020; Rouder & Haaf, 2019) showing that hierarchical Bayesian methods can produce reliable 
cognitive control indices, including difference score indices (Table 2). Our main research 
question was: can existing experimental tasks provide reliable individual differences estimates of 
cognitive control? We found that test-retest reliability (TRR) estimates for the delta parameters 
were found to be good or excellent. Compare this to the weak and moderate intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICC) in the first set of analyses. This suggests, that accounting for individual-level 
variability and the type and shape of the distribution “rescues” the reliability estimation as 
formulated by Rouder and Haaf (2019). Additionally, in both sets of analyses, reliability 
estimates were highest in the proactive session tasks, indicating that theoretical motivated task 
manipulations may improve reliability as well.  
In contrast, the stellar increase in difference score reliability was not matched by the 
between-task correlations. It has been suggested that the weak between-task correlations of 
classic cognitive control measures stem from a bottleneck of its reliability (Hedge, Powell, & 
Sumner, 2018). Our findings provide clear-cut evidence to the contrary; although the delta 
parameter can be estimated reliably, there is no relationship across delta parameters drawn from 
different tasks of cognitive control. This could indicate that cognitive control, as currently 
conceptualized, is not unified. In other words, classic cognitive control tasks may measure task-
specific processes, rather than a single process (this follows Rey-Mermet et al., (2018)).  
Although with decreasing likeliness, a measurement explanation behind the weak 
between-task correlations can still not be counted out completely. Our findings suggest that a 





differences in cognitive control. In addition to the delta parameter (i.e., a difference score of 
mean performance), we examined the sigma parameter extracted from the HBM. It seems quite 
plausible that individual differences in cognitive control are not captured by average 
performance, but rather by consistent performance as indexed by individual-level standard 
deviation and as suggested by Unsworth (2015) and others. Such view is corroborated by our 
findings (Tables C and D). The sigma parameter explains as much as 25% of the covariance 
within our task battery. Perhaps consistently controlling cognition is an important trait with 
substantial differences among individuals. Interestingly, the between-task correlations of the 
sigma parameter show that the Stroop incongruent trial variability does not correlate much with 
the other interference sigma parameters. Stroop is a mainstay of cognitive control, however, the 
task paradigm cannot seem to pick up on individual differences. Our results suggest that the 
Stroop does not belong in research that measures individual differences in cognitive control. 
9.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
One of the potential limitations of the current study design is the fully online format of 
data collection. However, at the time of writing, the worldwide pandemic has shifted most 
research to an online format. Yet, it is possible that potential distractions could occur while 
subjects complete these tasks at home or other non-laboratory settings, subsequently influencing 
the results of the study. However, the nature of this multi-session study made frequent laboratory 
visits less optimal and more time-consuming for data collection of a large sample size.  
Another limitation in the current study concerns the strategy training for the proactive 
condition of the AX-CPT task. As a refresher; subjects are provided with explicit information 
regarding the ratios of cue-probe associations, as well as receive training and practice in utilizing 





retest design; the explicit strategy training carries over to the retest baseline session. In other 
words, the retest baseline session correlates more strongly with the test proactive session, than it 
does with the test baseline session. This indicates that the strategy training effects task 
performance in the other sessions as well. Ideally, the task manipulation in the proactive 
condition for the AX-CPT in the DMC task battery should be reconsidered.  
An important future direction is the examination of the intra-individual variability (IIV) 
as an individual differences index of cognitive control. For example, the relationship between 
IIV and important cognitive constructs could reveal more about the underlying nature the 
variability. At this point it is not clear whether IIV (or sigma, or standard deviation) indeed 
emerges as a result of some underlying cognitive processes shared between different cognitive 
control tasks. One specific avenue is to examine the relationship between cognitive control sigma 
parameters and indices of mind wandering. Theoretically, mind wandering could serve as one of 
many possible criterions for trial variability in cognitive control tasks (see also Unsworth, 2015). 
Another interesting avenue could be examination of ways to reduce this variability, through 
perhaps training.  
9.2 Conclusion 
By implementing theory-based task manipulations, we examined whether existing 
experimental tasks of cognitive control are a viable tool for measuring individual differences. 
The experimental effects and shifts toward proactive and reactive control were as hypothesized, 
but the current results indicate that it remains a challenge for experimental tasks to produce 
robust individual differences. It required hierarchical Bayesian modeling to bring out reliable 
estimates; traditional approaches did not render robust estimates as expected. However, the 





estimates in the task battery. This indicates that reliability is not the cause of weak between-task 
correlations in the DMC task battery.  
We suggest that there are two methodological takeaways from the current study: One, 
needless to say, reliability is of great importance in scientific research. A field-breaking result is 
nothing but a statistical artifact if it cannot be reliably reproduced. Reporting the reliability of 
measures ought to be a standard procedure. Here we provide two approaches to calculating 
individual differences reliability that are suitable to be used on cognitive behavioral tasks data. 
These take in consideration some psychometric pitfalls that are often ignored in common 
statistical software packages. And two, statistical approaches should be used thoughtfully, taking 
in consideration the research design and assumptions of the method used. For example, some 
methods assume that the distribution of the underlying data is normal, while this is not always 
the case. Ignoring properties of the data (e.g., distribution shape, standard deviation) can lead to 
unreliable and inaccurate estimates of cognitive processes. Here, we make a case for hierarchical 
Bayesian analyses, which allowed us to model important properties of the data resulting in more 
precise parameter estimation.  
Through the implementation of different methods, we found that classic indices of 
cognitive control tasks can be estimated reliably. However, even though we addressed some 
prominent methodological issues, the underlying psychometric structure of cognitive control 
remains evasive. Finally, our results do suggest that intra-individual variability, rather than 
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11 Appendix A 
Table A1 
Stroop (Biased) Reliability across Sessions 
Measure Split-half (95% CI) Test-Retest (95% CI) M Range 
Baseline     
Reaction Time     
Congruent  1.00 (1.00–1.00) .91 (.88–.94) 781 ms 431 – 2706 ms 
Incongruent .99 (.98–1.00) .93 (.90–.96) 918 ms 477 – 2851 ms 
Stroop Effect .73 (.57–.83) .32 (.16–.47) 137 ms -267 – 385 ms 
Error     
Congruent  .93 (.89–.96) .16 (-.01–.32) 2.2 % 0 – 24 % 
Incongruent .80 (.72–.86) .23 (.06–.38) 5.2 % 0 – 40 % 
Stroop Effect .45 (.22–.62) .26 (.10–.42) 3.0 % -5 – 26 % 
Proactive     
Reaction Time     
Congruent  .99 (.99–1.00) .85 (.80–.89) 798 ms 415 – 3387 ms 
Incongruent 1.00 (1.00–1.00) .87 (.82–.91) 880 ms 450 – 3596 ms 
Stroop Effect .59 (.31–.77) .34 (.18–.49) 83 ms -200 – 300 ms 
Error     
Congruent  .81 (.68–.90) .69 (.58–.77) 1.2 % 0 – 27 % 
Incongruent .91 (.87–.94) .79 (.71–.82) 2.9 % 0 – 29 % 
Stroop Effect .46 (.10–.68) .39 (.23–.53) 1.7 % -4 – 18 % 
Reactive     
Reaction Time     
Congruent  1.00 (1.00–1.00) .91 (.87–.93) 790 ms 428 – 3787 ms 
Incongruent 1.00 (1.00–1.00) .88 (.83–.91) 882 ms 451 – 3763 ms 
Stroop Effect .87 (.78–.92) .33 (.17–.48) 93 ms -480 – 479 ms 
Error     
Congruent  .98 (.98–1.00) .82 (.76–.84) 1.6 %  0 – 40 % 
Incongruent .94 (.92–.96) .53 (.39–.64) 3.9 % 0 – 42 % 
Stroop Effect .88 (.84–.92) .78 (.70–.84) 2.3 % -28 – 21 % 










Cued Task Switching (Non-Incentivized) Reliability across Sessions 
Measure Split-half (95% CI) Test-Retest (95% CI) M Range 
Baseline     
Reaction Time     
Congruent  .98 (.98–.99) .60 (.31–.76) 906 ms 448 – 2370 ms 
Incongruent .89 (.84–.93) .52 (.35–.65) 983 ms 458 – 2657 ms 
TRCE .39 (.10–.61) .30 (.13–.45) 77 ms -319 – 921 ms 
Error     
Congruent  .88 (.84–.92) .51 (.34–.64) 3.9 % 0 – 38 % 
Incongruent .66 (.54–.74) .46 (.31–.58) 11 % 0 – 60 % 
TRCE .52 (.38–.64) .33 (.17–.47) 7.1 % -12 – 56 % 
Proactive     
Reaction Time     
Congruent  .99 (.98–.99) .79 (.67–.86) 718 ms 421 – 2203 ms 
Incongruent .90 (.86–.94) .66 (.55–.75) 780 ms 425 – 2343 ms 
TRCE .52 (.28–.68) .38 (.22–.52) 62 ms -236 – 683 ms 
Error     
Congruent  .84 (.77–.88) .66 (.55–.75) 4.3 % 0 – 34 % 
Incongruent .57 (.45–.68) .52 (.38–.64) 14.9 % 0 – 56 % 
TRCE .52 (.38–.64) .51 (.37–.63) 10.7 % -14 – 56 % 
Reactive     
Reaction Time     
Congruent  .99 (.98–.99) .66 (.42–.79) 1003 ms 501 – 2802 ms 
Incongruent .90 (.86–.94) .60 (.39–.74) 1098 ms 510 – 3311 ms  
TRCE .55 (.38–.69) .46 (.31–.59) 94 ms -642 – 967 ms 
Error     
Congruent  .84 (.76–.90) .35 (.19–.49) 1.5 % 0 – 31 % 
Incongruent .59 (.44–.70) .41 (.26–.55) 6.7 % 0 – 56 % 
TRCE .52 (.36–.66) .35 (.19–.49) 5.1 % -11 – 54 % 
Note. N = 128. CI = confidence interval; TRCE = task rule congruency effect. Split-half is an average of the 










AX-Continuous Performance Task Baseline Session Reliability  
Measure Split-half (95% CI) Test-Retest (95% CI) M Range 
 
Reaction Time     
AX trials  .98 (.96–.98) .63 (.43–.76) 449 ms 295 – 827 ms 
AY trials .87 (.83–.90) .69 (.58–.78) 540 ms 376 – 835 ms 
BX trials .88 (.84–.92) .51 (.25–.68) 516 ms 267 – 1468 ms 
BY trials .98 (.97–.98) .63 (.19–.81) 441 ms 273 – 788 ms 
PBI .66 (.55–.75) .31 (.10–.48) .03 -.40 - .24 
BX Interference .68 (.56–.77) 
 
.36 (.20–.51) 75 ms -109 – 872 ms 
Error     
AX trials  .89 (.86–.92) .27 (.10–.43) 6.6 % 0 – 80 % 
AY trials .44 (.27–.60) .18 (.01–.34) 7 % 0 – 44 % 
BX trials .68 (.57–.76) .20 (.02–.37) 13.8 % 0 – 80 % 
BY trials .64 (.48–.78) .05 (-.12–.22) 1.1 % 0 – 19 % 
A no-go trials .65 (.54–.74) .25 (.08–.40) 11.1 % 0 – 72 % 
B no-go trials .73 (.66–.80) .43 (.28–.56) 22.3 % 0 – 80 % 
PBI .69 (.59–.77) .16 (-.01–.32) -.18 -.94 - .89 
d′ context .78 (.70–.84) .36 (.16–.52) 2.85 -.23 – 4.4 
A-cue bias .56 (.42–.67) .18 (.01–.34) .09 -1.14 - .87 
BX Interference .62 (.50–.72) .15 (-.01–.31) 1.08 -.52 – 2.83 
Note. N = 121. CI = confidence interval; PBI = proactive behavioral index. Split-half is an average of the test 
















AX-Continuous Performance Task Proactive Session Reliability  
Measure Split-half (95% CI) Test-Retest (95% CI) M Range 
 
Reaction Time     
AX trials  .98 (.97–.99) .70 (.60–.78) 415 ms 257 – 832 ms 
AY trials .86 (.80–.90) .68 (.57–.77) 541 ms 378 – 871 ms 
BX trials .92 (.89–.94) .73 (.63–.80) 460 ms 259 – 1010 ms 
BY trials .98 (.98–.99) .80 (.73–.86) 410 ms 253 – 710 ms 
PBI .78 (.70–.84) .61 (.49–.71) .09 -.26 - .32 
BX Interference .74 (.65–.82) .57 (.44–.69) 51 ms -91 – 493 ms 
Error     
AX trials  .92 (.88–.94) .59 (.46–.69) 5.7 % 0 – 80 % 
AY trials .81 (.76–.86) .60 (.47–.70) 18.6 % 0 – 80 % 
BX trials .67 (.56–.76) .43 (.27–.57) 10.7 % 0 – 56 % 
BY trials .59 (.40–.73) .35 (.18–.49) 1.1 % 0 – 15 % 
A no-go trials .83 (.78–.88) .66 (.55–.75) 17 % 0 – 80 % 
B no-go trials .82 (.78–.87) .70 (.59–.78) 32 % 0 – 80 % 
PBI .80 (.73–.86) .54 (.40–.65) .16 -.89 - .94 
d′ context .81 (.73–.86) .55 (.41–.66) 3.09 -.92 – 4.40 
A-cue bias .79 (.71–.85) .59 (.47–.70) .37 -1.99 – 1.47 
BX Interference .62 (.50–.72) .28 (.11–.44) .93 -.5 – 2.47 
Note. N = 121. CI = confidence interval; PBI = proactive behavioral index. Split-half is an average of the test 

















AX-Continuous Performance Task Reactive Session Reliability  
Measure Split-half (95% CI) Test-Retest (95% CI) M Range 
 
Reaction Time     
AX trials  .98 (.98–.99) .75 (.61–.84) 435 ms 259 – 923 ms 
AY trials .91 (.88–.93) .69 (.53–.79) 558 ms 373 – 905 ms 
BX trials .88 (.84–.91) .67 (.49–.78) 546 ms 336 – 993 ms 
BY trials .98 (.98–.99) .76 (.55–.86) 420 ms 258 – 783 ms 
PBI .52 (.37–.64) .44 (.29–.58) .02 -.3 - .21 
BX Interference .67 (.56–.76) .52 (.39–.64) 125 ms -52 – 510 ms 
Error     
AX trials  .84 (.78–.88) .55 (.41–.66) 7.2 % 0 – 47 % 
AY trials .44 (.26–.58) .28 (.11–.44) 7.0 % 0 – 33 % 
BX trials .75 (.66–.82) .56 (.39–.68) 11.2 % 0 – 78 % 
BY trials .73 (.60–.82) .19 (.01–.35) 1.2 % 0 – 29 % 
A no-go trials .45 (.29–.59) .41 (.25–.55) 8.4 % 0 – 50 % 
B no-go trials .59 (.46–.70) .46 (.30–.59) 12.8 % 0 – 56 % 
PBI .65 (.53–.74) .23 (.06–.39) -.09 -.93. - .86 
d′ context .79 (.72–.85) .66 (.54–.75) 2.93 .58 – 4.4 
A-cue bias .52 (.38–.64) .45 (.29–.58) .06 -.8 - .82 
BX Interference .72 (.62–.80) .39 (.20–.55) .93 -.27 – 3.18 
Note. N = 121. CI = confidence interval; PBI = proactive behavioral index. Split-half is an average of the test 

















Sternberg (Critical) Reliability across Sessions 
Measure Split-half (95% CI) Test-Retest (95% CI) M Range 
 
Baseline     
Reaction Time     
NN  .94 (.91–.96) .57 (.44–.68) 834 ms 466 – 1704 ms 
NP .92 (.90–.94) .58 (.45–.68) 878 ms 444 – 1615 ms 
RN .76 (.69–.82) .46 (.32–.59) 951 ms 492 – 1750 ms 
Recency Effect -.02 (-.26–.24) .20 (.02–.36) 117 ms -201 – 480 ms 
Error     
NN  .73 (.62–.81) .28 (.11–.43) 3.6 % 0 – 56 % 
NP .84 (.78–.88) .58 (.45–.68) 13.2 % 0 – 58 % 
RN -.04 (-.26–.22) .45 (.29–.58) 17.3 % 0 – 60 % 
Recency Effect .20 (-.02–.40) .33 (.16–.47) 13.8 % -12 – 60 % 
Proactive     
Reaction Time     
NN  .92 (.88–.94) .63 (.51–.73) 834 ms 445 – 1477 ms 
NP .92 (.88–.94) .62 (.50–.72) 845 ms 420 – 1505 ms 
RN .76 (.70–.83) .52 (.36–.64) 1003 ms 448 – 1958 ms 
Recency Effect .18 (-.05–.42) .19 (.02–.34) 169 ms -180 – 560 ms 
Error     
NN  .68 (.55–.78) .42 (.27–.55) 5 % 0 – 50 % 
NP .80 (.73–.86) .47 (.32–.60) 12.4 % 0 – 60 % 
RN .16 (-.09–.38) .52 (.38–.64) 25.6 % 0 – 60 % 
Recency Effect .32 (.11–.49) .39 (.23–.53) 20.6 % -25 – 60 % 
Reactive     
Reaction Time     
NN  .84 (.77–.88) .51 (.37–.63) 851 ms 460 – 1661 ms 
NP .92 (.88–.94) .58 (.45–.69) 856 ms 482 – 1400 ms 
RN .88 (.84–.91) .66 (.54–.75) 963 ms 491 – 1582 ms 
Recency Effect .12 (-.15–.38) .21 (.05–.37) 85 ms  -176 – 350 ms 
Error     
NN  .54 (.32–.70) .34 (.18–.49) 4.3 % 0 – 50 % 
NP .78 (.72–.84) .49 (.35–.61) 10.3 % 0 – 54 % 
RN .50 (.32–.65) .62 (.50–.71) 12.7 % 0 – 56 % 
Recency Effect .78 (.72–.84) .42 (.27–.55) 8.3 % -25 – 50 % 
Note. N = 126. CI = confidence interval; NN = novel negatives; NP = novel positives; RN = recent negatives. 





12 Appendix B 
Table B1  
Spearman Rho Correlations of Between-Task Selected Measures, Baseline Session. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. A-Cue 3.16 0.68                       
2. BXI Error -0.13 0.12 .19*                     
3. BXI RT 67.47 71.71 .22* -.00                   
4. d′ 2.84 0.76 .57** .79** .00                 
5. PBI Error 0.05 0.09 .16 -.86** .14 -.63**               
6. PBI RT 0.04 0.07 -.25** .18* -.83** .14 -.34**             
7. Recency Error 0.13 0.10 -.01 -.25** -.06 -.12 .21* .05           
8. Recency RT 116.60 81.08 .13 -.04 -.00 .03 .08 -.10 .01         
9. Stroop Error 0.03 0.04 -.27** -.17 .01 -.27** .07 -.03 -.01 .04       
10. Stroop RT 138.21 65.84 .09 -.18* .10 -.12 .20* -.09 -.02 .08 .10     
11. TRCE Error -0.08 0.08 .24** .18 .03 .24** -.06 -.01 -.08 -.02 -.08 -.14   
12. TRCE RT 78.16 120.22 .15 .05 .12 .11 -.04 -.03 .01 .09 -.23* .03 -.26** 
Note. N = 120. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. BXI = BX Interference; d′ = d prime; PBI = 
Proactive Behavioral Index; Recency = recency effect; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Test and retest phase combined.  









Spearman Rho Correlations of Between-Task Selected Measures, Proactive Session. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. A-Cue 2.84 0.69                       
2. BXI Error -0.09 0.10 .21*                     
3. BXI RT 48.35 64.98 .36** -.22*                   
4. d′ 3.13 0.90 .53** .82** -.15                 
5. PBI Error -0.06 0.14 .34** -.66** .50** -.54**               
6. PBI RT 0.09 0.09 -.34** .37** -.78** .35** -.72**             
7. Recency Error 0.18 0.11 -.06 -.08 -.04 -.10 .06 -.07           
8. Recency RT 165.66 100.36 .02 .17 .11 .19* -.20* .02 -.00         
9. Stroop Error 0.02 0.02 -.33** -.15 -.02 -.33** .02 -.02 .05 -.05       
10. Stroop RT 82.81 53.41 -.10 -.31** .08 -.27** .19* -.17 -.11 .00 .29**     
11. TRCE Error -0.13 0.10 .06 .11 -.04 .09 -.03 .03 -.11 .03 -.01 -.16   
12. TRCE RT 32.96 64.87 .05 -.15 .08 -.13 .18* -.08 .08 -.03 -.12 .20* -.37** 
                         
Note. N = 120. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. BXI = BX Interference; d′ = d prime; PBI = 
Proactive Behavioral Index; Recency = recency effect; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Test and retest phase combined.  










Spearman Rho Correlations of Between-Task Selected Measures, Reactive Session. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. A-Cue 3.08 0.66                       
2. BXI Error -0.10 0.12 .29**                     
3. BXI RT 125.76 63.30 .22* .07                   
4. d′ 2.94 0.85 .57** .87** .13                 
5. PBI Error 0.03 0.08 .02 -.85** .01 -.76**               
6. PBI RT 0.02 0.05 -.15 .30** -.64** .25** -.40**             
7. Recency Error 0.08 0.09 -.05 -.24** -.02 -.26** .21* -.11           
8. Recency RT 87.80 75.81 .10 .12 .15 .19* -.10 -.04 -.10         
9. Stroop Error 0.02 0.05 -.24** -.32** -.09 -.37** .34** -.06 -.07 .08       
10. Stroop RT 91.29 64.23 -.07 -.26** .10 -.27** .24** -.19* .13 .00 .44**     
11. TRCE Error -0.05 0.05 .23* .23* .21* .31** -.19* -.10 -.08 .03 -.16 -.17   
12. TRCE RT 59.67 132.11 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.03 .06 -.01 .03 -.06 -.06 .06 -.16 
                         
Note. N = 120. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. BXI = BX Interference; d′ = d prime; PBI = 
Proactive Behavioral Index; Recency = recency effect; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Test and retest phase combined.  









Table B4  
Pearson r Correlations of Between-Task Selected Measures, Baseline Session. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. A-Cue 3.16 0.68            
2. BXI Error -0.13 0.12 .16           
3. BXI RT 67.47 71.71 .14 -.02          
4. d′ 2.84 0.76 .62** .66** -.04         
5. PBI Error 0.05 0.09 .11 -.92** .11 -.53**        
6. PBI RT 0.04 0.07 -.18* .19* -.87** .16 -.31**       
7. Recency Error 0.13 0.10 .02 -.23* -.00 -.13 .21* -.00      
8. Recency RT 116.60 81.08 .09 .02 .03 .03 .01 -.13 -.01     
9. Stroop Error 0.03 0.04 -.35** -.27** .10 -.29** .19* -.09 .02 .08    
10. Stroop RT 138.21 65.84 .08 -.13 .14 -.08 .15 -.15 -.01 .04 .11   
11. TRCE Error -0.08 0.08 .24** .13 -.00 .23* -.05 -.00 -.08 -.01 -.12 -.09  
12. TRCE RT 78.16 120.22 .14 -.01 .06 .05 .05 -.03 -.02 .07 -.23* .05 -.36** 
Note. N = 120. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. BXI = BX Interference; d′ = d prime; PBI = 
Proactive Behavioral Index; Recency = recency effect; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Test and retest phase combined.  










Pearson’s r Correlations of Between-Task Selected Measures, Proactive Session. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. A-Cue 2.84 0.69                       
2. BXI Error -0.09 0.10 .18*                     
3. BXI RT 48.35 64.98 .26** -.35**                   
4. d′ 3.13 0.90 .51** .78** -.22*                 
5. PBI Error -0.06 0.14 .37** -.57** .48** -.48**               
6. PBI RT 0.09 0.09 -.28** .45** -.79** .40** -.74**             
7. Recency Error 0.18 0.11 -.00 -.04 -.07 -.11 .08 -.07           
8. Recency RT 165.66 100.36 .06 .19* .04 .19* -.17 .03 .00         
9. Stroop Error 0.02 0.02 -.24** -.30** .09 -.30** .10 -.12 .07 -.12       
10. Stroop RT 82.81 53.41 -.05 -.32** .15 -.24** .18* -.19* -.10 .03 .19*     
11. TRCE Error -0.13 0.10 .05 .09 -.04 .08 -.04 .05 -.12 .03 -.04 -.18*   
12. TRCE RT 32.96 64.87 .00 -.15 .01 -.18 .18* -.05 .03 -.05 -.10 .19* -.34** 
Note. N = 120. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. BXI = BX Interference; d′ = d prime; PBI = 
Proactive Behavioral Index; Recency = recency effect; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Test and retest phase combined.  










Pearson’s r Correlations of Between-Task Selected Measures, Reactive Session. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. A-Cue 3.08 0.66            
2. BXI Error -0.10 0.12 .34**           
3. BXI RT 125.76 63.30 .22* -.04          
4. d′ 2.94 0.85 .64** .74** .08         
5. PBI Error 0.03 0.08 -.08 -.91** .16 -.68**        
6. PBI RT 0.02 0.05 -.13 .32** 
-
.70** 
.28** -.44**       
7. Recency Error 0.08 0.09 -.06 -.11 -.01 -.18* .09 -.10      
8. Recency RT 87.80 75.81 .11 .06 .13 .16 -.06 -.06 .02     
9. Stroop Error 0.02 0.05 -.13 -.24** -.02 -.21* .26** -.08 -.04 .14    
10. Stroop RT 91.29 64.23 -.07 -.15 .08 -.19* .15 -.14 .10 .02 .38**   
11. TRCE Error -0.05 0.05 .23* .23* .16 .30** -.22* -.08 .00 .06 -.10 -.12  
12. TRCE RT 59.67 132.11 .04 -.08 -.03 -.01 .10 -.01 .04 -.01 -.03 .00 -.17 
Note. N = 120. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. BXI = BX Interference; d′ = d prime; PBI = 
Proactive Behavioral Index; Recency = recency effect; TRCE = Task Rule Congruency Effect. Test and retest phase combined.  
** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
 
